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Abstract: In this paper Ce pro)ide eDperimental e)idence indicatinE that incenti)e 
contracts ma1 undermine )oluntar1 cooperationF 9his suEEests that eDplicit incenti)es 
ma1 ha)e costl1 side effects that ha)e Heen larEel1 neElected H1 economistsF In our 
eDperiments the undermininE effect is so stronE that the incenti)e contracts are less 
efficient than contracts Cithout an1 incenti)esF Iu1ersJ Cho are in the role of 
principalsJ nonethelessJ prefer the incenti)e contracts Hecause the1 alloC them to 
appropriate a much larEer share of the KsmallerL total surplus and areJ henceJ more 
profitaHle for themF 9he undermininE of )oluntar1 cooperation throuEh incenti)es isJ 
in principleJ consistent Cith models of ineMuit1 a)ersion and reciprocit1F Ndditional 
eDperiments shoCJ hoCe)erJ that the reduction of )oluntar1 cooperation throuEh 
incenti)es is partl1 due to a framinE effectF If the incenti)e is framed as a price 
deduction the reduction of )oluntar1 cooperation is much stronEer compared to a 
situation Chere the incenti)e is framed as a Honus paid on top of a Hase priceF  
JEL-ClassificationO PQRJ CSRJ !TQ 
Keywords: Incenti)e contractsJ reciprocit1J incomplete contractsJ )oluntar1 
cooperationJ eDperimentsF 
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5conomic theories almost alCa1s rel1 in some Ca1 on the effecti)eness of 
performance incenti)esF :rom the economistis )ieCpoint the Muestion Ch1 certain 
actions are undertaken is closel1 related to the Muestion Chich incenti)es the decisionV
makers are facinEF 9here can thus He little douHt that the effecti)eness and the limits 
of performance incenti)es HelonE to the fundamental Muestions in economicsF In this 
paper Ce eDamine eDperimentall1 hoC Hu1ers in a Hu1erVseller relationship use the 
a)ailaHle incenti)es and to Chat eDtent the pro)ision of performance incenti)es 
undermines the sellersi propensit1 to cooperate )oluntaril1F  
>ur results shoC that incenti)e contracts ma1 undermine )oluntar1 cooperationF In 
our eDperiments the reduction in )oluntar1 cooperation is so stronE that contracts 
pro)idinE eDplicit performance incenti)es are on a)eraEe less efficient than fiDedV
price contracts that do not pro)ide an1 performance incenti)es at allF 9his result 
contradicts the standard economic model predictinE that the incenti)e contract Cill He 
more efficient than the contract Cithout incenti)esFR In spite of the efficienc1 loss the 
Hu1ersJ as principalsJ ha)e a material ad)antaEe from the pro)ision of incenti)es 
Hecause the incenti)e contracts alloC them to reap a much larEer share of the smaller 
surplusF 9husJ the redistriHuti)e effect of incenti)e contracts is sufficientl1 stronE to 
o)erVcompensate the induced efficienc1 lossF  
ae also shoC that the undermininE of )oluntar1 cooperation isJ in principleJ 
consistent Cith models of ineMuit1 a)ersion and reciprocit1 that assume full1 rational 
aEents KeFEFJ :ehr and 8chmidt RSSSJ Iolton and >ckenfels [ZZZLF ;oCe)erJ 
additional eDperiments indicate that a siEnificant part of the undermininE effect is due 
to the neEati)e framinE of the eDplicit incenti)eF If the incenti)e is framed as a price 
deduction in case of malfeasanceJ the sellers are much less CillinE to cooperate 
)oluntaril1 compared to a situation Chere a Honus is paid on top of a Hase 
compensation in case of appropriate performanceF 9his difference in the Heha)ior of 
sellers across frames occurs despite the fact that j in economic terms j the priceV
deductionVframe is identical to the HonusVframeF 9hereforeJ most rational choice 
models of reciprocit1 and ineMuit1 a)ersion are not consistent Cith the framinE effectF[ 
                                                 
R :or our purposes Ce define the standard economic model H1 tCo assumptionsF :irstJ indi)iduals are 
full1 rational and secondJ the indi)idualsi oH]ecti)e function is defined in Muite a narroC Ca1 in the 
sense that onl1 income and the costs of effort matterF :or seminal papers on the standard approach seeJ 
eFEFJ ;olmstrkm KRS_SLJ ?rossman and ;art KRSY\LJ ;art and ;olmstrkm KRSY_L and PeCitt KRSYYLF 
InterestinE o)er)ieCs aHout the empirical e)idence are pro)ided in ?iHHons KRSS_L and `renderEast 
KRSSSLF  
[ 9he potential eDemption is the model H1 !ufCenHerE and eirchsteiEer KRSSSLJ Chich Eenericall1 
eDhiHits a larEe numHer of eMuiliHria in seMuential Eames like the one considered in this paperF 9his 
  [
It seems that H1 framinE incenti)es positi)el1 or neEati)el1J perceptions of kindness 
and hostilit1J Chich are crucial for reciprocal responsesJ can He manipulatedF 9he 
framinE effect ma1J thereforeJ He due to a shift in the reference point that pro)ides the 
Hasis for ]udEinE actions as hostile or kindF !ifferent frames ma1J hoCe)erJ also affect 
the pla1ersi HeliefsJ ChichJ in case of multiple eMuiliHriaJ ma1 induce the pla1ers to 
pla1 a different eMuiliHriumF  
In our )ieC these results are important Hecause )oluntar1 cooperation is a 
characteristic feature of man1 real Corld conteDtsF ahene)er aEents ha)e discretion 
o)er the intensit1 or the t1pe of acti)it1 the1 performJ )oluntar1 cooperation is )er1 
)aluaHle for principalsF In case of the emplo1ment relationshipJ for instanceJ the 
rele)ance of )oluntar1 cooperation is neatl1 confirmed H1 the eDtensi)e stud1 of 
IeCle1 KRSS^J RSSSL Cho reports the folloCinEO lManaEers claim that Corkers ha)e 
so man1 opportunities to take ad)antaEe of emplo1ers that it is not Cise to depend on 
coercion and financial incenti)es alone as moti)atorsm KIeCle1 RSS^J pF [^[LF 
doluntar1 cooperation is also often important in markets for compleD production 
inputs like customifed softCareF In these markets it is t1picall1 not possiHle to specif1 
all the potential continEencies in a contract so that the Hu1ers depend on the sellersi 
)oluntar1 cooperationF  
In the standard principalVaEent approach the aEentsi oH]ecti)e function isJ in 
EeneralJ assumed to He increasinE and strictl1 conca)e in incomeJ decreasinE in effort 
and additi)el1 separaHle in the tCo arEumentsF 9his model pro)ides the Henchmark for 
our definition of )oluntar1 cooperationO If aEents determine their effort H1 maDimifinE 
the oH]ecti)e function assumed in the standard approach the1 do not cooperate 
)oluntaril1F IfJ in contrastJ the1 Cork harder Ce speak of )oluntar1 cooperationF 
doluntar1 cooperation ma1 ha)e different sourcesO NEents ma1 He simpl1 irrational or 
the1 ma1 ha)e an intrinsic preference for the acti)it1F NEents ma1 also Cork harder 
Hecause the1 eDhiHit ineMuit1 a)ersion or a preference for reciprocit1F Nnother 
possiHilit1 is that aEents ma1 Cant to Eain the social appro)al of rele)ant reference 
aEents H1 pro)idinE eDcess effort relati)e to their narroC material selfVinterestF 9he 
neElect of these sources of )oluntar1 cooperation in the standard approach is no HiE 
proHlem as lonE as these factors do not interact Cith the incenti)es pro)idedF\ netJ as 
                                                                                                                                            
means thatJ for a Ei)en incenti)e contractJ multiple Mualit1 le)els are consistent Cith eMuiliHrium 
Heha)ior of the sellersF If framinE affects the selection of eMuiliHria our framinE result could He 
consistent Cith this modelF 
\ >ccasionall1 )oluntar1 cooperation has Heen taken into accountF ;olmstrkm and MilErom KRSSRL 
assumeJ eFEFJ that emplo1eeis are CillinE to pro)ide positi)e effort le)els in the aHsence of an1 
performance incenti)esF 9his is a critical assumption for their conclusion that in a multiVtaskinE 
en)ironment principals ma1 do Hetter if aEents face no incenti)es at allF 
  \
our eDperiments suEEestJ eDplicit incenti)es ma1 interact in important Ca1s Cith 
ineMuit1 a)ersionJ Hounded rationalit1 and reciprocit1 moti)esF In additionJ the1 are 
likel1 to interact Cith social appro)al andJ perhapsJ also Cith taskVspecific intrinsic 
moti)ationFQ 
9here is a larEe literature in social ps1choloE1J Chich suEEests that material 
reCards for a pleasant acti)it1 ma1 decrease the intrinsic moti)ation to perform this 
acti)it1 KseeJ eFEF !eci and 61an RSY^LF^ :re1 KRSS\L andJ in particularJ :re1 KRSS_L 
discuss the rele)ance of this literature to economicsF 6ecentl1J there has Heen a deHate 
reEardinE the )alidit1 of the empirical claims put forCard in this literature KseeJ eFEFJ 
Cameron and `ierce RSSQJ 5isenHerEer and Cameron RSSTJ !eciJ eoestner and 61an 
KRSSSLJ eunf and `faff [ZZ[J :ehr and :alk [ZZ[LF In the concludinE section Ce 
compare our results Cith the eDperiments and claims made in the social ps1choloE1 
literatureF 9he most important difference concerns the fact that in our eDperiments the 
incenti)es are set H1 the principals Chile in the social ps1choloE1 eDperiments the 
aEents face predetermined incenti)es that ha)e Heen set H1 the eDperimenterF 9his 
means that this t1pe of eDperiment cannot capture moti)ational forces like ineMuit1 
a)ersion or reciprocit1 arisinE from the interaction HetCeen principals and aEentsF  
9he remainder of this paper is orEanifed as folloCsF In the neDt section Ce Cill 
descriHe the eDperimental desiEn and the eDperimental proceduresF In 8ection \ Ce 
deri)e the Heha)ioral predictionsF 8ection Q presents the resultsF In 8ection ^ Ce 
summarife our findinEs and pro)ide a concludinE discussionF  
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9he Hasic feature of our desiEn is the comparison of tCo treatments in the conteDt of a 
lEift eDchanEe Eamem as de)eloped H1 :ehrJ eirchsteiEer and 6iedl KRSS\LF 9he first 
treatmentJ pro)idinE the HaselineJ is the soVcalled l9rustV9reatmentm Khenceforth 99LF 
Its main purpose is to estaHlish the eDtent of )oluntar1 cooperation in the aHsence of 
performance incenti)es for cooperationF 9he second treatment is the lIncenti)eV
9reatmentm Khenceforth I9LF 9he I9 is identical to the 99J Cith the eDception that 
performance incenti)es for contractual compliance are introducedF 9o eDamine the 
reasons for the undermininE of )oluntar1 cooperation in the I9 Ce ha)e conducted an 
additional treatmentJ Chich Ce call Ionus 9reatment Khenceforth I9LF ae Cill 
                                                 
Q In :ehr and :alk K[ZZ[L one of us deals more eDplicitl1 Cith these interactionsF  
^ 6ecentl1J IonaHou and 9irole KRSSSL de)eloped a model that neatl1 formalises the croCdinE out of 
intrinsic moti)ation H1 eDtrinsic incenti)esF 
  Q
present and discuss the I9 in 8ection QF In the current section Ce Cill descriHe the 99 
and the I9 and the common procedural details that Cere implemented in all 
treatmentsF  
 
[FR The Trust-Treatment 
9he constituent Eame Cas a )ersion of the lEift eDchanEe EamemJ Chich comprises 
three staEesF In the first staEe Hu1ers make a contract offerJ Chich consists of a fiDed 
price p and a desired Mualit1 le)el qp F In the second staEe sellers can decide Chether 
the1 Cant to accept one of the a)ailaHle contract offers made H1 the Hu1ersF 9he third 
staEe is entered onl1 if sellers accept a contract offerF In the third staEe the1 then 
choose their Mualit1 le)elF 9he1 are not committed H1 the Hu1eris desired Mualit1 le)el 
qp J iFeFJ the1 ma1 choose q ! qp . In the eDperimentsJ a Hu1eris profit is Ei)en H1O 
 
     vq – p   if the contract is acceptedq 
KRL   ! r 
Z  if no contract is concluded. 
 
vq is the return for the Hu1er as a function of the selleris actual Mualit1 q. In the 
eDperiments v r RZZ and prices p ha)e to oHe1 Z " p " RZZF Nctual and desired Mualit1 
le)els ha)e to He elements of the set #ZFRJ ZF[J FFFJ R$F  
 
9he selleris pa1off in the eDperiment is Ei)en H1  
 
p – cKqL   if the contract is acceptedq 
K[L    u = 
Z   if no contract is concluded. 
 
sualit1 q causes disutilit1 cKqLF In the eDperiments cKqL Cas determined accordinE to 
9aHle RF  
9NIc5 R  
Quality levels and costs of quality for the seller in TT and IT. 
q, qp  ZFR ZF[ ZF\ ZFQ ZF^ ZFT ZF_ ZFY ZFS R 
cK qp L, cKqL  Z R [ Q T Y RZ R[ R^ RY 
 
  ^
[F[ The Incentive-Treatment 
9he Hasic difference HetCeen the I9 and the 99 is the Hu1ersi possiHilit1 of punishinE 
sellers in the I9 Chose Mualit1 choice falls short of qp , provided the selleris shirkinE 
can He )erifiedF In particularJ Hu1ersi contract offers in the I9 also specif1 j in 
addition to p and qp  j a fine f that has to He paid to the Hu1er in case that q t qp  can He 
)erifiedF 8hirkinE can He )erified Cith proHaHilit1 Z t s t RF aith proHaHilit1 R j s 
shirkinE cannot He )erified andJ henceJ the Hu1er is committed to pa1 p. 9hereforeJ a 
Hu1eris KeDpectedL pa1off in the I9 is 
 
    vq – p   if the contract is accepted and q % qp q 
K\L   ! = vq – p + sf  if the contract is accepted and q < qp q 
Z  if no contract is concluded. 
 
N seller Cho does not shirk earns the contractuall1 aEreedVupon price and has to Hear 
the Mualit1 costsJ iFeF her utilit1 is p – cKqLF 9his is also the utilit1 in case of 
un)erifiaHle shirkinEF In case of )erifiaHle shirkinE the price is reduced H1 the fine fF 
9hereforeJ a selleris KeDpectedL pa1off is Ei)en H1 
 
    p – cKqL  if the contract is accepted and q % qp  
KQL    u =  p – cKqL j sf if the contract is accepted and q < qp . 
 Z  if no contract is concludedF 
 
In the eDperiment the proHaHilit1 Cith Chich shirkinE could He )erified Cas s = Ru\F 
9he fine had to oHe1 the restriction Z " f " R\FT Nll the other parameters and 
restrictions Cere the same as in the 99F In Hoth treatments all the pla1ers kneC their 
oCn pa1off functions and the pa1off functions of the tradinE partnersJ iFeFJ vJ cKqL as 
Ei)en in 9aHle RJ s and the feasiHle )alues of p and f Cere knoCn to all the pla1ersF 
Ioth in the 99 and the I9 the Hu1ersi marEinal return from an increase in q is RZ 
ChileJ accordinE to 9aHle RJ the marEinal cost of q is alCa1s much loCerF 9here are 
thus hiEh efficienc1 Eains from hiEher le)els of q and q r RZ is the first Hest le)el of 
qF_  
                                                 
T In realit1 there are often limits to principalsi sanctioninE possiHilitiesF 8ome of these limitations are 
due to leEal reEulationsJ normsJ or collecti)e HarEaininE aEreementsF It is also possiHle that these limits 
arise endoEenousl1 Hecause the monitorinE technoloE1 is not perfect or there is a proHlem of lmoral 
hafardm on the principalsi sideF In additionJ aEents ma1 also face liMuidit1 constraints prohiHitinE larEe 
finesF  
_ >ne referee asked Chat Could happen if the efficienc1 Eains from hiEher M Cere loCerF 9here is 
e)idence that eDperimental suH]ects care positi)el1 for efficienc1 in nonVstrateEic settinEs Chere one 
  T
 
[F\ Procedures and common features 
Nfter their arri)al all the suH]ects Cere randoml1 allocated their roles as Hu1ers and 
sellersJ respecti)el1F Nll suH]ects kept their role durinE the Chole eDperimentF 5)er1 
suH]ect participated in one treatment onl1F 9he eDperiments Cere conducted manuall1F 
Nfter the suH]ects had Heen assiEned their rolesJ sellers and Hu1ers Cere sent to 
different rooms Chere the1 Cere seated remote from each otherF 8uH]ects first had to 
read their instructions Ksee NppendiDL and then the1 had to ansCer a set of 
h1pothetical Muestions to test their understandinE of pa1off calculationsF 9he 
eDperiments started onl1 after all the suH]ects had Ei)en correct ansCers to all the 
MuestionsF Most suH]ects Cere aHle to ansCer the h1pothetical Muestions in less than 
RZ minutesF >ccasionall1 it happened that one or tCo suH]ects in a session needed 
more than RZ minutesF  
In Hoth treatments there Cere siD suH]ects in the role of a Hu1er and eiEht suH]ects 
in the role of a sellerF Nt the HeEinninE Hu1ers first had to decide pri)atel1 on a 
contract offer and to enter it into a decision sheetF In the I9J after Hu1ers had made 
their choiceJ the1 had to roll a siDVsided dieJ Chich determined Chether shirkinEJ in 
case it occurredJ could He )erifiedF In particularJ if the numHers R and [ turned upJ the 
selleris Mualit1 choice could He )erifiedJ iFeFJ in case of shirkinE the Hu1er could collect 
the specified fine f. If a numHer HetCeen \ to T turned upJ shirkinE Cas not )erifiaHleF 
Nfter all the Hu1ers had made their choice KandJ in the I9J rolled the dieL all contract 
offers Cere made puHlic H1 CritinE them on the HlackHoard in the Hu1ersi roomF 9hen 
the Hu1ersi contract offers Cere transmitted to the sellersi roomJ Chere the1 Cere also 
Critten on the HlackHoardF 9he sellers could then choose j in a random order j amonE 
the a)ailaHle contract offersF 5ach Hu1er could onl1 emplo1 one seller and each seller 
could onl1 accept one ]oHF ;enceJ there Cas an eDcess suppl1 of sellersF Ioth Hu1ers 
and sellers kneC the eDact numHer of pla1ers on each side of the marketF 9he reason 
for this Cas that Ce Canted to pre)ent Hu1ers from offerinE hiEh prices simpl1 
Hecause the1 feared the re]ection of their offersFY 
                                                                                                                                            
pla1er can unilaterall1 dictate the Chole allocation of material pa1offs K5nEelmann and 8troHl [ZZ[LF In 
strateEic settinEsJ hoCe)erJ efficienc1 considerations do not seem to affect pla1ersi social preferencesF 
:ehr and cist K[ZZ[L ha)e conducted trust Eames in Chich the efficienc1 of the HackVtransfer of the 
secondVmo)er )ariedF In the Haseline condition the secondVmo)er had to spend vR to increase the firstV
mo)eris pa1off H1 vRF In the hiEhVefficienc1 condition the firstVmo)ersi pa1off increased H1 v\ for 
e)er1 vR the second mo)er spent on the HackVtransferF netJ in Hoth conditions the secondVmo)ers spent 
the same amount on HackVtransfers indicatinE the aHsence of an efficienc1 moti)eF  
Y Nfter Ce had conducted our eDperiments Ce Hecame aCare of the Cork of Irandts and Charness 
K[ZZRL Cho report the remarkaHle result that prices and Mualit1 in Eift eDchanEe markets are the same 
reEardless of Chether the numHer of sellers is HeloC or aHo)e the numHer of Hu1ersF 9his indicates that 
competition has little or no impact on outcomes in Eift eDchanEe marketsF  
  _
8ellers Cho accepted a contract had to determine their actual Mualit1 le)elF 9he1 
had to insert their choice into a decision sheetF In the I9 the1 had to make this decision 
Hefore knoCinE Chether their Mualit1 choice could He )erifiedF ;oCe)erJ immediatel1 
after the1 had made their choice the1 Cere privately informed aHout )erificationJ iFeFJ 
Chether the1 Could ha)e to pa1 the fine in case of shirkinEFS Nfter a seller had 
determined his Mualit1J the eDperimenter informed the respecti)e Hu1er Kand noHod1 
elseL of the actual Mualit1 le)elF 9hus Mualit1 le)els Cere pri)ate information of the 
tCo parties in)ol)ed in a tradeF 9his settinE rules out an1 Eroup effects reEardinE the 
choice of Mualit1 le)elsF Nt the end of the third staEe Hu1ers and sellers had to 
calculate their pa1offsF Nfter pa1offs had Heen calculated a neC market Cas openedF 
9o alloC for learninE and to test the roHustness of decisionsJ Ce had tCel)e periods 
Kcalled ltradinE da1smL in Chich the aHo)eVdescriHed market Cas operati)eF Nll the 
pla1ers in the market kneC thisF  
In the eDperiment Ce a)oided potential )alueVladen termsF 9hereforeJ the fine Cas 
descriHed in a neutral Ca1 as a lpotential price deductionmF 9he instructions in the 
NppendiD pro)ide further details on the framinE of termsF  
Iefore Ce put forCard our Heha)ioral predictions Ce Cant to stress that our 
eDperimental procedures ensured that noHod1 Cas e)er informed of the tradinE 
partneris identit1F 9husJ a pla1er Cho concluded a contract onl1 kneC that this 
contract Cas concluded Cith someHod1 on the other side of the marketF `la1ers did not 
knoC the identification numHers of their tradinE partners nor did the1 knoC their 
current tradinE partneris past Heha)iorF It Cas thus completel1 impossiHle for a pla1er 
to Eain an indi)idual reputationFRZ Note also that Hu1ers could not make offers to 
specific sellersF 9he1 onl1 could make offers to the marketJ iFeFJ the Chole Eroup of 
sellersJ and then indi)idual sellers could accept one of the a)ailaHle offers in a random 
orderF 9husJ e)en if sellers Could ha)e had the opportunit1 to Eain an indi)idual 
reputation forJ eFEFJ HeinE a hiEh Mualit1 sellerJ it Could ha)e Heen impossiHle for them 
to Eain from this reputation Hecause it Cas impossiHle for the Hu1ers to select their 
tradinE partnerF Nll these eDperimental procedures Cere implemented to enhance the 
oneVshot nature of a tradinE da1F 
                                                 
S ae also informed the nonVshirkers Chether the1 Could ha)e had to pa1 the fine if the1 had shirkedF 
9his Cas done to enhance the crediHilit1 of our random )erification procedureF 9echnicall1J sellers Cere 
informed aHout )erification H1 checkinE the appropriate HoD on their decision sheets Ksee instructions in 
the NppendiDLF 9husJ since all the sellers Cere informed aHout )erification the1 could not identif1 the 
shirkers amonE themF 
RZ In this reEard it is also important that the offers Cere Critten on the HlackHoard in a random orderF 
ae implemented a random order to pre)ent possiHle identification of Hu1ersF 9hereforeJ it Cas not 
possiHle that indi)idual Hu1ers could Eain a reputation for particular offersF  
  Y
In total Ce conducted R\ sessions Cith Y Hu1ers and T sellers eachF In the I9 Ce 
ran four and in the 99 fi)e sessionsF In additionJ Ce conducted Q sessions in the Ionus 
9reatment KI9L to eDamine framinE effectsF In total RY[ underEraduates from the 
uni)ersities in gurich participated in our eDperimentsF Nll the participants Cere 
recruited from a larEe dataHase to minimife the likelihood that the1 knoC each otherFRR 
In principleJ losses Cere possiHle in our eDperimentsF 9hereforeJ Ce endoCed all 
suH]ects Cith an additional amount of S 8Ciss :rancsF Nll losses had to He co)ered H1 
this endoCment and the earninEs made durinE the eDperimentsF 8uH]ects Cere paid in 
cash immediatel1 after the eDperimentsF Nn eDperiment lasted HetCeen [ and [F^ 
hoursF 8uH]ects earned on a)eraEe ^Z 8Ciss :rancs KaHout v\TL includinE a shoCVup 
fee of R^ 8Ciss :rancsF 9he hourl1 earninEs of 8Ciss students for temporar1 ]oHs are 
rouEhl1 [Z j [^ 8Ciss :rancsF  
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\FR Behavior in the Trust Treatment  
!ue to the oneVshot nature of our EameJ a rational seller Chose preferences are Ei)en 
H1 K[L Cill alCa1s choose the minimal Mualit1 qmin Hecause hiEher Mualit1 le)els are 
costl1 and 1ield no returnF ConseMuentl1J the Hu1er Cill offer the minimal price that is 
necessar1 to induce the seller to accept the contractJ iFeFJ the Hu1er offers p = R.R[  
;oCe)erJ the situation chanEes suHstantiall1 if sufficientl1 man1 sellers ha)e a 
propensit1 to cooperate )oluntaril1 in response to Eenerous contract offersF In our 
eDperiments a ma]or reason for )oluntar1 cooperation is likel1 to He found in suH]ectsi 
lsocial preferencesmF N consideraHle numHer of studies indicate that a suHstantial 
fraction of eDperimental suH]ects j across a Cide )ariet1 of different suH]ect pools j 
does eDhiHit social preferences Kfor sur)e1s seeJ eFEFJ :ehr and 8chmidt [ZZZJ 8oHel 
[ZZRLF N person eDhiHits social preferences if the person does not onl1 care aHout the 
material resources allocated to her Hut also cares aHout the material resources 
allocated to rele)ant reference aEentsF In the conteDt of our eDperiments social 
preferences impl1J for eDampleJ that the actions of the sellers are not onl1 affected H1 
                                                 
RR N postVeDperimental Muestionnaire confirmed that indeed most suH]ects had ne)er met another 
participant HeforeF 
R[ `rice offers had to He inteEersF 9hereforeJ if sellers ha)e selfish preferences a price offer of R can He 
an eMuiliHrium outcomeF >f courseJ price offers of fero can also He an eMuiliHrium outcomeF In the 
folloCinE Ce alCa1s concentrate on the strict eMuiliHrium in Chich sellers are strictl1 Hetter off Chen 
the1 accept the contractF  
  S
the performance incenti)es the1 themsel)es face Hut also H1 the percei)ed fairness of 
the pa1off allocation resultinE from the contract offerF  
suite an eDtensi)e literature has emerEed discussinE the different moti)ational 
sources of social preferencesF 9he literature is Hased on the de)elopment of formal 
models of ineMuit1 a)ersionJ reciprocit1 and spitefulness and on a larEe set of 
eDperiments that isolate the different moti)ational sources for nonVselfish Heha)iorsF 
6aHin KRSS\LJ !ufCenHerE and eirchsteiEer KRSSSL and :alk and :ischHacher KRSSSL 
ha)e de)eloped reciprocit1 models Chile :ehr and 8chmidt KRSSSL and Iolton and 
>ckenfels K[ZZZL de)eloped models of ineMuit1 a)ersionF N reciprocal indi)idual 
responds to actions that are percei)ed to He kind in a kind mannerJ and to actions that 
are percei)ed to He hostile in a hostile mannerF ahether an action is percei)ed as kind 
or hostile depends on the fairness or unfairness of the conseMuences and the intention 
associated Cith the actionF 9he fairness of the intentionJ in turnJ is determined H1 the 
eMuitaHilit1 of the pa1off distriHutionJ relati)e to the set of feasiHle pa1off 
distriHutionsJ caused H1 the actionF IneMuit1 a)ersion modelsJ in contrastJ do not 
depend eDplicitl1 on the percei)ed fairness or unfairness of the intentions Hut the1 also 
rel1 on the percei)ed fairness of the actionsi conseMuencesF  
Intuiti)el1 it is eas1 to see that reciprocit1 or ineMuit1 a)ersion models predict that 
sellers )oluntaril1 cooperateJ iFeFJ choose q w qminJ in response to Eenerous contract 
offersF 6eciprocal sellers infer kind intentions from Eenerous offers andJ thereforeJ 
the1 reciprocate KseeJ eFEFJ !ufCenHerE and eirchsteiEer [ZZZLF IneMuit1 a)erse sellers 
are CillinE to put forCard nonVminimal Mualit1 le)els in response to Eenerous prices 
Hecause H1 raisinE the Mualit1 le)el the1 can implement outcomes that the1 percei)e as 
more eMuitaHleF 9o illustrate this let us consider a simplified )ersion of the model H1 
:ehr and 8chmidt KRSSSLF In the tCoVpla1er case the utilit1 function of an ineMuit1 
a)erse KiFeFJ fairL pla1er is Ei)en H1  
 
K^L Ui(x) = xi - "i maD#xj - xi,0$ - %i maD#xi - xj,0$, 
 
i & #1,2$, i ' j, Chere x=(x1,x2) denotes the )ector of monetar1 pa1offs and "i % %iJ  
0 ( %i < 1F 9he term CeiEhted Cith "i measures the utilit1 loss that stems from 
ineMualit1 to iis disad)antaEeJ Chile the term CeiEhted Cith %i measures the loss from 
ad)antaEeous ineMualit1FR\ :or con)enience Ce use a Erossl1 simplified )ersion of this 
                                                 
R\ In principleJ ineMuit1 a)ersion is not the same as ineMualit1 a)ersionF :or laHorator1 eDperiments 
ineMualit1 a)ersion ma1J hoCe)erJ He a Eood first approDimation of ineMuit1 a)ersionF 9he suH]ects 
t1picall1 enter the laHorator1 as eMualsJ the1 donit knoC an1thinE aHout each otherJ and the1 are 
allocated to different roles in the eDperiment at randomF 9husJ it seems natural to assume that the 
eEalitarian outcome constitutes a salient reference pointF  
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model Hecause the purpose of the suHseMuent deliHerations is not to pro)ide precise 
Muantitati)e predictions Hut to illustrate some important Mualitati)e reEularities arisinE 
from ineMuit1 a)erse preferencesFRQ ae assume that fair suH]ects eDhiHit "i % %i = 0.5F 
In a dictator Eame suH]ects Cith such preferences are CillinE to Ei)e ^Z percent of the 
mone1 to the recipient Chereas Chen HeinE in the responder role in an ultimatum 
Eame the1 re]ect offers that Ei)e them less than [^ percent of the a)ailaHle mone1F ae 
also assume that j at the Mualit1 staEe of the eDperiment j the onl1 reference pla1er for 
the seller is his Hu1erF 9his alloCs us to use the tCoVperson utilit1 function aHo)e to 
stud1 the Mualit1 Heha)ior of the sellersF ae Helie)e that this assumption approDimates 
the suH]ectsi perception of the situation Cell Hecause the1 do not knoC the Mualit1 that 
is pro)ided in other tradesF In additionJ once a contract has Heen concluded the Hu1er 
has clearl1 a salient position for a seller in our eDperimentF  
>nce a fair seller Cith the aHo)e preferences has accepted a contract in the 99 he 
CillJ for sufficientl1 hiEh pricesJ choose a Mualit1 le)el such that ! = RZZq j p r  
p j cKqL r u holdsFR^ !ifferentiation of this eMuation shoCs that Mualit1 responds to a 
price chanEe accordinE to dqudp r [u&RZZxciKqL' w ZF 9husJ H1 raisinE the selleris price 
sufficientl1 such that u w ! holds at qminJ the seller is induced to choose a pa1off 
eMualifinE Mualit1 le)elJ Chich Ce denote H1 qeJ and the hiEher the price the hiEher 
Cill He qeF Nn immediate conseMuence of this is that if the fraction of fair sellers is 
sufficientl1 hiEhJ e)en purel1 selfish Hu1ers ha)e an incenti)e to pa1 Eenerous pricesF  
`re)ious eDperimental research has shoCn that in Eames that are similar to our 99 
Mualit1 le)els are indeed positi)el1 affected H1 prices and that j for certain price 
ranEes j the Hu1ers can raise their profits H1 raisinE prices Kfor o)er)ieCs seeJ eFEFJ 
:ehr and 8chmidt [ZZZJ 8oHel [ZZR or ?ychter and :ehr [ZZRLFRT  
 
\F[ Behavior in the Incentive Treatment 
NnaloEous to the 99 Ce first discuss the Heha)ioral predictions for the case that all the 
Hu1ers and sellers are selfish and rationalF N selfish seller Cill accept a contract in the 
I9 if the participation constraint  
 
KTL      p % cKq*L 
                                                 
RQ 9o Eenerate more precise Muantitati)e predictions at the indi)idual le)el it CouldJ eFEFJ He necessar1 
that ! )aries Cith the amount of ad)antaEeous ineMualit1F If ! is constant the aEent either prefers full 
eMualit1 or does not care for eMualit1 at allF   
R^ >f courseJ if the price is so loC that for all feasiHle Mualit1 le)els ! w u holds the seller chooses qminF  
RT 9hese results also hold in hiEhVstake en)ironmentsF In :ehr and 9ouEare)a KRSSTL suH]ects earnedJ on 
a)eraEeJ the monetar1 income of ten Ceeks in a Eift eDchanEe eDperiment similar to the 99 presented in 
this paperF  
  RR
 
holdsF In KTL q* denotes the Mualit1 le)el that maDimifes the selleris material pa1offF N 
rational and selfish riskVneutral seller Cho has accepted a contract Cill perform at the 
desired Mualit1 le)el KiFeFJ q = qp L if the NoV8hirkinE Condition KN8CL 
 
K_L     sf % cK qp L  
 
is satisfiedFR_ 9he seller Cill perform at the desired le)el if the eDpected fine sf for 
shirkinE is larEer than the costs of contractual complianceJ Chich are Ei)en H1  
cK qp L – cKqminL r cK qp L Hecause cKqminL r Z Ksee 9aHle RLF It is eas1 to check that Cith our 
parameterifation of s r Ru\ and f " R\ Mualit1 costs of QF\\ can He enforcedF ;enceJ 
accordinE to the Mualit1 cost function in 9aHle RJ the larEest Mualit1 le)el that can He 
enforced H1 an incenti)e compatiHle contractJ Chich Ce denote H1 4pq J is Ei)en H1 4pq  
r ZFQF More Eenerall1J the Hest repl1 Mualit1 choice q* of a riskVneutral seller Cho is 
rational and selfish is Ei)en H1O 
 
     qmin  for all f, qp  that oHe1 KRu\Lf t cK qp L 
KYL    q* =  
     qp  for all f, qp  that oHe1 KRu\Lf % cK qp LF 
 
8ince the marEinal re)enue of Mualit1 is RZ Chile the marEinal cost of Mualit1 is 
alCa1s strictl1 HeloC RZJ a profitVmaDimifinE Hu1er Cho keeps the seller at her 
reser)ation utilit1J Cill alCa1s prefer the hiEhest enforceaHle Mualit1 le)el 4pq  r ZFQF  
ae can summarife the aHo)e discussion for the I9 in the folloCinE Heha)ioral 
predictionO If all the suH]ects are selfish and rational Ce Cill oHser)e that sellers accept 
all contracts oHe1inE p ) c(q*) and choose the Mualit1 le)el q* accordinE to KYLF 
Iu1ersJ thereforeJ offer the contract *p = c( 4pq ) + 1 = 5; f = fmax = 13; qp  = 4pq  = 
0.4+FRY Note that if this prediction is met q – q* Cill He feroJ iFeFJ there Cill He no 
)oluntar1 cooperation. Moreo)erJ sellersi Heha)ior then Cill not respond to )ariations 
in the price offered so that it is not possiHle to induce positi)e )oluntar1 cooperation 
Kq – q* w ZL H1 offerinE a Eenerous priceF In additionJ selfVinterested sellers Cill not 
reduce their Mualit1 HeloC q* in response to loC pricesF  
                                                 
R_ 9o deri)e our Henchmark predictions Ce assume that suH]ects in our eDperiment are risk neutral 
HecauseJ as 6aHin K[ZZZL has shoCnJ assuminE risk a)ersion o)er the t1pical stake le)els in laHorator1 
eDperiments is hiEhl1 implausiHleF 5)en small deErees of risk a)ersion o)er t1pical eDperimental stakes 
impl1 an aHsurd deEree of risk a)ersion o)er larEe stakesF 
RY 9here is anotherJ nonVstrict suHEame perfect eMuiliHriumJ in Chich p = QJ f r R\J 4pq r ZFQ holds and 
Chere the seller accepts the contract and chooses q* r ZFQF :or empirical purposes the sliEht difference 
HetCeen these tCo eMuiliHria is neEliEiHleF  
  R[
9he situation aEain is suHstantiall1 different if Ce account for the presence of 
reciprocal or ineMuit1 a)erse sellersF 9o keep the eDposition simple Ce aEain 
concentrate on the case of ineMuit1 a)erse sellers as descriHed in the pre)ious 
suHsectionF If an ineMuit1 a)erse seller faces a contract KpJ qp J fL such that qp  is HeloC 
qeJ the seller Cill ne)er shirkF InsteadJ the seller Cill choose qe w qp  Ksee :iEure RLF 9his 
means that for all contracts in Chich qp  t qe an ineMuit1 a)erse seller eDhiHits the same 
Heha)ior as in the 99F In these contracts the fine does not affect the selleris response 
Hecause the seller does not consider performinE HeloC qp F 9he situation chanEesJ 
hoCe)erJ if qp  is aHo)e qeF In this case an ineMuit1 a)erse seller CouldJ in principleJ 
prefer to reduce the Mualit1 to qe Hut if he does so he faces the threat of HeinE finedF  
Nn ineMuit1 a)erse seller Cho decides to shirk ma1 end up in one of tCo 
situationsF aith proHaHilit1 s he Cill He cauEht shirkinE and Cill ha)e to pa1 the fine fF 
If the seller kneC for sure that he Could end up in this situation he Could choose a 
Mualit1 le)el such that the pa1off difference HetCeen the Hu1eris pa1off RZZq j p x f 
and his oCn pa1off p j cKqL j f is remo)edF In :iEure R Ce denote this Mualit1 H1 q f F 
aith proHaHilit1 R j s shirkinE Cill not He )erified and the seller does not ha)e to pa1 
a fineF If the seller kneC for sure that he Could end up in this situation he Could 
choose the Mualit1 le)el qe Ksee :iEure RLF 9husJ in case of shirkinEJ the selleris Mualit1 
Cill He HetCeen q f  and qeFRS 8ince eDVante the seller does not knoC in Chich situation 
he Cill end up his utilit1 from shirkinE Us is Ei)en H1 
 
KSL Us r s!p j cKqL j f j "&RZZq j p x f j Kp j cKqL j fL'" 
 x KRjsL!p j cKqL j %&p j cKqL j KRZZq j pL'"F  
 
ae can eDamine the conditions under Chich a shirkinE seller prefers to pro)ide q f F 
!ifferentiation of Us Cith respect to Mualit1 Ei)es  
 
 ,Usu,q r j ciKqL j !RZZ x ciKqL"!s" j KRjsL%" 
 
It is eas1 to see that this eDpression is alCa1s neEati)e if s" j KRjsL% is positi)eF ahen 
this is the case the utilit1 from shirkinE is maDimifed at q f F 9husJ if the selleris 
ineMuit1 a)ersion is sufficientl1 Hiased aEainst disad)antaEeous ineMualit1 KiFeFJ " ) 2% 
for s r Ru\L a shirkinE seller prefers to reduce the Mualit1 pro)ided HeloC the 
eEalitarian Mualit1 qe that Could He chosen if there Cere no fine or if the Hu1er 
demanded a Mualit1 at or HeloC qeF In other CordsJ once the seller has decided to shirk 
                                                 
RS If at qmin the Hu1eris pa1offJ RZZq j p x fJ is still HiEEer than the selleris pa1offJ p j cKqL j fJ the seller 
chooses q such that qmin " q " qe holdsF  
  R\
the eDistence of the fine has a counterproducti)e effect Hecause the shirkinE seller 
chooses a loCer Mualit1 Cith the fine than Cithout the fineF 9his isJ of courseJ not the 
onl1 effect of the fine Hecause the fine also affects Chether the seller decides to shirkF  
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9o see this in more detail Ce Crite the utilit1 from nonVshirkinEJ UnsJ as 
 
KRZL Uns r p j cK qp L j "&RZZ qp  j p j Kp j cK qp LL'F  
 
9he term in parenthesis measures the difference HetCeen the Hu1eris and the selleris 
pa1off at qp F 9he seller prefers to perform at qp  if Uns % Us holdsF UsinE KSL and KRZL 
the nonVshirkinE condition can He Critten as  
 
KRRL s"&RZZq j p x f j Kp j cKqL j fL' x KRjsL%&p j cKqL j KRZZq j pL' % 
 % cK qp L j cKqL j sf x "&RZZ qp  j p j Kp j cK qp LL' 
 
RZZq – p x f 
RZZq – p  
p j cKqL 
p j cKqL j f  
quality 
qf qe 
  RQ
Intuiti)el1J the riEht hand side of KRRL measures the pecuniar1 and the nonVpecuniar1 
Eains from shirkinEO cK qp L j cKqL j sf measures the monetar1 Eains from shirkinE Chile 
"&RZZ qp  j p j Kp j cK qp LL' measures the nonVpecuniar1 ineMualit1 costs associated Cith 
the proposed contractF I1 shirkinE the seller can a)oid these nonVpecuniar1 costsF 9he 
leftVhand side of KRRL measures the nonVpecuniar1 ineMualit1 costs that arise from 
shirkinEF Note that if the seller chooses q f the first term on the left side )anishes Chile 
if the seller chooses qe the second term on the left side )anishesF Condition KRRL shoCs 
thatJ H1 decreasinE the monetar1 Eains from shirkinEJ the fine deters shirkinEF In 
additionJ KRRL indicates that the ineMualit1 associated Cith the contract is also a 
decisi)e shirkinE determinantF 9he more uneMual the pa1off distriHution of a proposed 
contract the more likel1 it is that the seller shirksF :inall1J the nonVshirkinE condition 
also hiEhliEhts the important role of qp  for the shirkinE decisionF ahile in the 99 qp  
represents onl1 cheap talkJ in the I9 a hiEher le)el of qp  makes it more likel1 that the 
nonVshirkinE condition is )iolatedF In case that qp  eDceeds qe a rise in qp  increases the 
monetar1 Eains as Cell as the nonVpecuniar1 Eains from shirkinEF  
9he pre)ious discussion shoCs that in the presence of ineMuit1 a)ersion the 
incenti)e contract ma1 not necessaril1 do Hetter than a pure trust contract j in fact it 
ma1 e)en do CorseF ;oCe)erJ ineMuit1 a)ersion is not the onl1J and perhaps not e)en 
the most importantJ reason Ch1 the incenti)e contract ma1 do CorseF Incenti)e 
contracts ma1 also cause neEati)e side effects if reciprocit1 moti)es alone are presentF 
6ememHer that reciprocit1 means that sellers respond in a hostile manner to actions 
that re)eal a hostile intentionF In our )ieC the fininE of sellers ma1 re)eal hostile 
intentions for tCo reasonsF[Z :irstJ the fine per se ma1 He percei)ed as hostileF 8econdJ 
threateninE to fine a seller is an indication of distrustF 9o the eDtent to Chich trustinE 
actions are percei)ed as kind and distrustinE actions as hostileJ a fine Cill He percei)ed 
as a hostile actF ahate)er the true reason for percei)inE someHod1is intention as 
hostileJ if the sellers percei)e the fine as a hostile act the1 ma1 no lonEer He CillinE to 
put forCard the same Mualit1 compared to a situation Cith no fineF  
 
 
                                                 
[Z 9o our knoCledEe there is no formal model of reciprocit1 that captures these tCo reasons eDplicitl1F  
  R^
QF 658Uc98 
In the folloCinE Ce first descriHe the results for the 99 and the I9F 9hen Ce mo)e on 
to discussinE the I9F In the 99 Hu1ers offered \^_ contracts in totalJ of Chich all Hut 
one Cere acceptedF In the I9 the total numHer of offered contracts Cas [Y_ and _ of 
them K[FQ percentL Cere re]ectedF Iefore Ce pro)ide a detailed statistical anal1sis of 
suH]ectsi )oluntar1 cooperation Heha)ior Ce present the e)idence at a more 
descripti)e le)elF >ur first result pro)ides insiEhts into the a)eraEe contract offered H1 
the Hu1ers in the 99 and the I9F 
 
Result 1O In the TT buyers offer, on average, higher prices and demand higher quality 
levels than in the IT. The average fine in the IT is close to the maximum fine.  
 
8upport for 6R is pro)ided in 9aHle [F 9aHle [ summarifes the a)eraEe Heha)ior o)er 
all the periods in the I9 and the 99 and compares them Cith the predictions of the 
selfVinterest model for Hoth treatmentsF It shoCs that the a)eraEe price offered in the 
99 is consideraHl1 hiEher than in the I9F 9he same reEularit1 is eDhiHited H1 median 
pricesF 9he median price is more than tCo times larEer in the 99 than in the I9F 9aHle 
[ also pro)ides information on the a)eraEe and median finesF Note that the median 
fine is eDactl1 the maDimal fine of f r R\F In factJ Hu1ers in the I9 imposed the 
maDimum fine in TS percent of all cases and onl1 in Q contracts the1 chose f r ZF It isJ 
thereforeJ not surprisinE that the a)eraEe fine is close to the maDimal fineF 9aHle [ also 
indicates that qp  is consideraHl1 larEer in the 99F >n a)eraEeJ qp  r ZFT^ in the 99 
Chile Hu1ers desire onl1 qp  r ZFQS in the I9F 
 
9NIc5 [ 
Contracts and actual quality levels in the Trust and the Incentive Treatment 
 9rustV9reatment K99L 
N r \^T 
 Incenti)eV9reatment KI9L 
N r [YZ 
`redictionsO Kp*rRJ q*rZFRL   Kp*r^J f*=13, qp *rZFQJ q*rZFQL 
NctualO p qp  q  p f qp  q  
Mean \ZF[ ZFT^ ZF\_  RSF_ RRF_ ZFQS ZF[_  
Median \QFZ ZF_Z ZF\Z  R^FZ R\FZ ZF^Z ZF\Z  
8tdFde)F R_FT ZF[_ ZF[T  R[FT [FT ZFR_ ZFR_  
 
9he freMuent use of maDimal fines toEether Cith the consideraHl1 loCer prices in the 
I9 con)e1s the impression that Hu1ers in the I9 relied to a larEe eDtent on the lstickm 
  RT
and much less on the lcarrotm compared to the 99F It isJ therefore interestinE to see 
hoC this strateE1 is related to actual Mualit1 le)els and to the sellersi CillinEness to 
cooperate )oluntaril1F[R 
 
Result 2O Quality and voluntary cooperation are lower in the IT compared with the 
TT. This is due to the following reasons: KiL A fraction of sellers shirks in the IT even 
when the No-Shirking Condition (NSC) is met. KiiL Voluntary cooperation Kq – q* w ZL 
vanishes almost completely for incentive compatible contracts in the IT. KiiiL If the 
NSC is violated in the IT sellers choose the minimum quality in the vast majority of 
cases. In the TT quality levels above the minimum are provided in the majority of 
cases. Ki)L In the TT voluntary cooperation responds strongly to the price level while 
in the IT voluntary cooperation does no longer respond to the price levelF  
 
N first indication for 6[ is Ei)en in 9aHle [J Chich shoCs that the mean actual Mualit1 
le)el is loCer in the I9F :urther support for 6[ is pro)ided H1 :iEure [J Chich presents 
the distriHutions of actual Mualit1 le)elsF 9he fiEure shoCs that the distriHution of 
Mualit1 has consideraHl1 more mass at loCer le)els in the I9F 9his is also confirmed H1 
a eolmoEoro)V8mirno)Vtest Kprob t ZFZZRLF In particularJ in the I9 onl1 _F^ percent of 
Mualit1 le)els are aHo)e ZF^J Chereas in the 99 Mualit1 le)els aHo)e ZF^ account for 
aHout [_ percent of all Mualit1 choicesF 9he distriHution of Mualit1 choices in the I9 
shoCs tCo peaks j one at qmin r ZFR and the other at q r ZFQF In contrastJ in the 99 
there is onl1 one mode at qminF ;oCe)erJ rouEhl1 _Z percent of all Mualit1 choices in 
the 99 are at nonVminimal le)elsF  
9aHle \ sheds liEht on the reasons for the hiEher Mualit1 le)els in the 99F 9he taHle 
separates actual choices alonE tCo dimensionsO KiL !oes actual Mualit1 de)iate from 
the Hest repl1 Mualit1 q*J iFeFJ to Chat eDtent is there eDcess Mualit1 or underV
performance relati)e to the selfVinterest model3 KiiL !oes the contract meet the N8C  
sf % cK qp L3  
9he first interestinE result in 9aHle \ concerns Mualit1 Heha)ior in cases Chere the 
N8C is metF 9he final column of the taHle informs us that the condition Cas met in 
QRF\ percent KRR^ out of [YZL of all the contracts in the I9F 9he taHle also indicates 
that in RTF^ percent of these cases KRS out of RR^L sellers shirkedF In the )ast ma]orit1 
of these cases sellers chose qminF Moreo)erJ there Cere onl1 tCo cases of a seller 
pro)idinE eDcess Mualit1 Chen the N8C Cas metF 9his means that for incenti)e 
compatiHle contracts )oluntar1 cooperation is almost completel1 remo)edF 9hese 
                                                 
[R In the folloCinE the terms lNoV8hirkinE Condition KN8CLm and lincenti)e compatiHle contractsm 
relate to ineMualit1 K_LJ sf # cK qp LJ in the teDtF  
  R_
reEularities also mean thatJ on a)eraEeJ sellers in the I9 pro)ide less than the Hest 
repl1 Mualit1 Chen the1 face incenti)e compatiHle contractsF 9his result is also 
confirmed H1 :iEure \ Chich shoCs that the a)eraEe Mualit1 for incenti)e compatiHle 
contracts Ksee I9VICVEraphL is Eenerall1 HeloC q*.  
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!istriHution of sellersi actual Mualit1 choices 
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Sellers’ deviation from the best reply quality level q* in the IT and the TT 
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Note: 5ntries are numHer of cases in the respecti)e cateEor1F q* denotes the Hest repl1 Mualit1 choice 
accordinE to KYLF  
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;oC did the sellers respond to nonVincenti)e compatiHle contracts3 In T[ percent of 
those cases in Chich the N8C Cas )iolated in the I9 KRZ[ out of RT^ casesLJ Mualit1 
choices conform to the Hest repl1 le)el q* r ZFRJ iFeFJ sellers shirk full1F ComparinE 
this result Cith the Mualit1 Heha)ior in the 99 Ce oHser)e a HiE difference Hecause in 
TS percent of all the contracts in the 99 K[QQ out of \^TL sellers pro)ide Mualit1 aHo)e 
the minimumF 9he fact that in T[ percent of the nonVincenti)e compatiHle I9Vcontracts 
sellers deli)er the minimal Mualit1J Chile in TS percent of the 99Vcontracts the1 
pro)ide Mualit1 aHo)e the minimal le)elJ is Muite remarkaHleF :rom the )ieCpoint of 
the standard model sellers should eDhiHit identical Heha)ior in these tCo situationsF 
9his result isJ hoCe)erJ consistent Cith ineMuit1 a)ersion and notions of reciprocit1F 
:or instanceJ once ineMuit1 a)erse sellers ha)e decided to shirk the1 are fined Cith 
positi)e proHaHilit1F 9his CillJ in EeneralJ induce them to perform less than Chat the1 
Could He CillinE to pro)ide in the 99F 9husJ the consideraHl1 loCer Mualit1 le)els for 
nonVincenti)e compatiHle contracts in the I9 can He taken as an indication that 
)oluntar1 cooperation is undermined H1 the use of finesF 
:iEure \ pro)ides further support for this interpretationF 9he fiEure shoCs that in 
the 99 )oluntar1 cooperation is hiEh and depends positi)el1 on the price le)elF 
Moreo)erJ this pattern of )oluntar1 cooperation pre)ails in all three time inter)als 
depicted in :iEure \ indicatinE staHilit1 o)er timeF[[ 9his contrasts sharpl1 Cith the 
pattern of )oluntar1 cooperation oHser)ed for nonVincenti)e compatiHle contracts in 
the I9 Ksee Eraph I9zNIC in :iEure \LF 5Dcept at )er1 loC price le)els )oluntar1 
cooperation is Eenerall1 loCer in the I9 and it does not respond positi)el1 to the priceF  
 
                                                 
[[ 8ee ?ychter and :alk K[ZZ[L for a recent eDperimentJ Chich eDaminedJ amonE other thinEsJ the 
impact of learninE and eDperience in a tCent1 times repeated eDperiment KCith chanEinE opponentsL that 
Cas akin to our 99F In their eDperiment learninE and eDperience also did not diminish )oluntar1 
cooperation o)er timeF 
 
  RS
:I?U65 \ 
doluntar1 cooperation Kq j q*L as a function of prices 
VZFR
Z
ZFR
ZF[
ZF\
ZFQ
ZF^
ZFT
ZF_
Intervals of offered prices 
99
I9zNIC
I9zIC
period RVQ period ^VY period SVR[
 
 
 
9he Eraphical results depicted in :iEure \ are also confirmed H1 more detailed 
econometric anal1ses of )oluntar1 cooperation in the 99 and the I9F :or the 99 Ce 
reEressed Kq j q*L on a constantJ prices and the desired Mualit1 le)elF >ur reEressions 
take into account that the dependent )ariaHle is censored at fero and the reported 
standard errors are Hased on the fact that onl1 oHser)ations across sessions are 
independent Chile oHser)ations Cithin a Ei)en session are dependentF 9aHle Q presents 
the results of our 99VreEressionsF 9he taHle shoCs that in each of the suHVperiods for 
Chich Ce conducted the reEression as Cell as for the reEression Cith the data from all 
periods price increases are associated Cith hiEhl1 siEnificant increases in )oluntar1 
cooperationF 6ecall that accordinE to the :ehrV8chmidt model the desired Mualit1 le)el 
represents merel1 cheap talkJ iFeFJ it should not affect actual Mualit1 choicesF It turns 
out that in the first Q periods qp  does affect actual Mualit1 positi)el1 Hut in the 
remaininE periods qp  is no lonEer siEnificantF 9his pattern of )oluntar1 cooperation 
contrasts sharpl1 Cith the pattern oHser)ed in the I9F  
  [Z
TABLE 4 
Response of voluntary cooperation to offered prices in the Trust Treatment 
 !ependent )ariaHleO q – q* 
 all periods periods RVQ periods ^VY periods SVR[ 
 coefF 
KroHF sFeFL 
fV
)alue 
coefF 
KroHF sFeFL 
fV
)alue
coefF 
KroHF sFeFL 
fV
)alue 
coefF 
KroHF sFeFL 
fV
)alue 
constant  VZF[Y^444 
KZFZ[Q\L 
VRRF_^ VZF\RS444 
KZFZYQ\L 
V\F_S VZFRYR444 
KZFZQ_YL 
V\F_Y VZF\SS444 
KZFZYS[L 
VQFQ_ 
pit  ZFZR[444 
KZFZZRQL 
YFS\ ZFZRZ444 
KZFZZRL 
RZFTR ZFZR[444 
KZFZZZSL 
R[FSZ ZFZRQ444 
KZFZZ[_L 
^F\R 
itqp   ZFRSS444 KZFZ_TL 
[FT\ ZF\\T444 
KZFRRQSL 
[FS\ ZFRR^ 
KZFRRS[L 
ZFS_ ZFRY_ 
KZF[Z__L 
ZFSZ 
 N r \^T 
cc r VSQF[_ 
aald ![K[Lr\YSFS  
p r ZFZZZ 
N r RRS 
cc r V[QF_\ 
aald ![K[Lr[YZFY  
p r ZFZZZ 
N r RRS 
cc r V[ZF_Y 
aald ![K[Lr\R\FR  
p r ZFZZZ 
N r RRY 
cc r VQ[F_Q 
aald ![K[Lr TSFY  
p r ZFZZZ 
Note: 9he estimation procedure is censored reEression Cith roHust standard errorsF pit denotes the price that Corker i 
recei)ed in period tF itqp  denotes the desired Mualit1 le)el Corker i faced in period tF 6oHust standard errors are in 
parenthesesF 444J 44J 4 denote siEnificance at the RVJ ^V and RZVpercent le)elJ respecti)el1F  
 
9he results of our econometric anal1sis of )oluntar1 cooperation for the I9 are 
reported in 9aHle ^ Chere Ce reEressed q – q* on a constant and a dumm1 IC for 
incenti)e compatiHle contractsF ae also interacted the ICVdumm1 and a dumm1 for 
nonVincenti)e compatiHle contracts KNICL Cith prices pit and desired Mualit1 le)els itqp F 
Most importantl1J the taHle shoCs that pit interacted Cith NIC is close to fero and 
ne)er siEnificantF 9his indicates that for nonVincenti)e compatiHle contracts prices 
ha)e no effect on )oluntar1 cooperationF `rices ha)e a small siEnificant impact for 
incenti)e compatiHle contracts j the hiEher the price the loCer is on a)eraEe the 
sellersi shirkinEF N further interestinE result is that the desired Mualit1 le)el has a 
negative impact on )oluntar1 cooperationF 6ecall that in the 99 qp  had a positi)e Hut 
insiEnificant impact HetCeen periods ^ and R[ indicatinE that qp  represents cheap talkF 
;oCe)erJ for the incenti)e compatiHle contracts in the I9 qp  has a larEe neEati)e 
impact on )oluntar1 cooperation durinE these periodsF In additionJ qp  also has a 
neEati)el1 siEnificant impact in nonVincenti)e compatiHle contracts for the data of all 
periods as Cell as for the data in the final three periodsF   
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9NIc5 ^ 
Response of voluntary cooperation (q – q* > 0) and under-performance(q – q* < 0) to 
prices in the Incentive Treatment 
 !ependent )ariaHleO q – q* 
 all periods periods RVQ periods ^VY periods SVR[ 
 coefF 
KroHF sFeFL 
fV
)alue
coefF 
KroHF 
sFeFL 
fV
)alue
coefF 
KroHF sFeFL 
fV
)alue 
coefF 
KroHF sFeFL 
fV
)alue 
constant ZF[_T444 
KZFZ^Y_L 
QF_Z ZF[\^44 
KZFZS\SL 
[F^R ZF\Z^444 
KZFZST_L 
\FR^ ZF\^Y444 
KZFRRZQL 
\F[Q 
IC  VZFR\Z4 
KZFZ__RL 
VRFTS VZFZYZ 
KZFR^SSL 
VZF^Z VZFRQ[ 
KZFR[QYL 
VRFR\ VZF[RT 
KZFR\S\L 
VRF^^ 
pit(IC  ZFZZ^444 
KZFZZRSL 
[F_\ VZFZZR 
KZFZZR[L 
VZFST ZFZZY44 
KZFZZ\SL 
[FZT ZFZZS4 
KZFZZQ_L 
RFS\ 
pit(NIC  ZFZZ[ 
KZFZZR[L 
RF[Y ZFZZR 
KZFZZRTL 
ZFT\ ZFZZR 
KZFZZ\^L 
ZF\\ ZFZZQ 
KZFZZ\QL 
RFZ\ 
itqp (IC VZF_T^444 KZFRS\L 
V\FST VZF\_[ 
KZF\RZ\L 
VRF[Z VZFSSQ444 
KZF\\SL 
V[FSQ VZFY_T44 
KZF\YRYL 
V[F[S 
itqp (NIC
  VZF[YS44 
KZFRZ^QL 
V[F_Q VZFRSZ 
KZFR^^QL 
VRF[[ VZF\ZY 
KZF[^[[L 
VRF[[ VZF^[Y444 
KZFRYQZL 
V[FY_ 
 N r [YZ 
cc r TYFT\ 
aald ![K^LrRZ[F_  
p r ZFZZZ 
N r S^ 
cc r [_FY 
aald ![K^LrQRF\  
p r ZFZZZ 
N r SZ 
cc r RYF_T 
aald ![K^Lr\_FY 
p r ZFZZZ 
N r S^ 
cc r [TFQS 
aald ![K^Lr\\FQ^ 
p r ZFZZZ 
Note: 9he estimation procedure is censored reEression Cith roHust standard errorsF IC denotes a dumm1 for the incenti)e 
compatiHle contractsF pit!IC is an interaction )ariaHle of the ICVdumm1 Cith pricesF pit!NIC is an interaction )ariaHle of pit 
Cith the dumm1 NICJ Chich denotes nonVincenti)e compatiHle contractsF itqp !IC K itqp !NICL is an interaction HetCeen qp  
and the dumm1 IC KNICLF 6e]ected contract offers are eDcludedF 6oHust standard errors are in parenthesesF 444J 44J 4 
denote siEnificance at the RVJ ^V and RZVpercent le)elJ respecti)el1F 
 
9he neEati)e impact of qp  on )oluntar1 cooperation in the I9 is not compatiHle Cith 
the standard modelF If sellers are rational and selfVinterested the1 pro)ide the desired 
Mualit1 in case of incenti)e compatiHle contracts and the1 full1 shirk in case of nonV
incenti)e compatiHle contractsF In the conteDt of the standard model a hiEher qp  ma1 
render a contract nonVincenti)e compatiHle if the hiEher )alue of qp  )iolates the noV
shirkinE condition sf % cK qp LF Iut Cithin the class of incenti)e compatiHle contracts 
and Cithin the class of nonVincenti)e compatiHle contractsJ hiEher )alues of qp  Cill not 
affect )oluntar1 cooperation and underperformance. netJ if sellers areJ eFEFJ ineMuit1 
a)erse then a hiEher desired Mualit1 le)el ma1 Cell affect )oluntar1 cooperation and 
underperformanceF 9his is so HecauseJ in addition to the pecuniar1 costs of shirkinEJ 
)ariations in qp  also affect the percei)ed fairness of the contract offer in the I9F Ns our 
discussion of the N8C KRRL for ineMuit1 a)erse sellers has shoCn a hiEher le)el of qp  
  [[
Cill increase the nonVpecuniar1 Eains from shirkinEF 9husJ e)en if a rise in qp  lea)es 
the N8C for selfish sellers KiFeF sf % cK qp LL intact the rise ma1 ne)ertheless )iolate the 
N8C for ineMuit1 a)erse sellers Hecause it is also associated Cith an increase in the 
nonVpecuniar1 Eains from shirkinEF 9his shoCs that in case that the N8C for selfish 
sellers is met ineMuit1 a)erse sellers ma1 increase underperformance in response to a 
rise in qp F cikeCiseJ it can He shoCn that if the N8C for selfish sellersJ sf % cK qp LJ is 
alread1 )iolated an ineMuit1 a)erse seller ma1 reduce )oluntar1 cooperation in 
response to an increase in qp F 9o see this assume that sf % cK qp L is )iolated and that qp  
is initiall1 HeloC qe j inducinE the ineMuit1 a)erse seller to pro)ide q r qe initiall1F 
Nssume further that the rise in qp  renders qp  larEer than qeF :rom our discussion in 
8ection \F[ Ce knoC that ineMuit1 a)erse sellers ma1 Cell respond to this H1 reducinE 
Mualit1 HeloC qeF 
In )ieC of 6[ it is interestinE to Chat eDtent the reduction of )oluntar1 
cooperation reduces the total surplus SJ defined as the total material pa1offs from a 
contractJ in the I9 relati)e to the 99F Iefore Ce present this result it is CorthChile to 
emphasife that the standard model implies that S is more than tCo times hiEher in the 
I9 than in the 99F ;oCe)erJ in stark contrast to this h1pothesis Ce can report the 
folloCinE resultO 
 
Result 3O The total surplus S is on average higher in the TT than in the IT. This holds 
irrespective of whether we compare the TT-contracts with incentive compatible or 
with non-incentive compatible IT-contracts. The profit for the buyers is highest for 
incentive compatible contracts, second highest for TT-contracts and lowest for non-
incentive compatible IT-contractsF  
 
6\ Hasicall1 means that the incenti)e opportunities in the I9 alloC Hu1ers to increase 
their profits relati)e to the 99 Hut that this is associated Cith an efficienc1 lossF 
8upport for 6\ is presented in 9aHle TJ Chich compares the actual Cith the predicted 
surplus and shoCs Hu1ersi and sellersi a)eraEe profits from a contractF Note first that 
in the 99 the realifed surplus eMuals \\ Chile it is onl1 [RF^ for nonVincenti)e 
compatiHle contracts and [_F^ for incenti)e compatiHle contractsF 9husJ relati)e to the 
surplus predicted H1 the standard model for the 99 Ce oHser)e a more efficient 
outcome in the 99 that is due to sellersi )oluntar1 cooperationF 9o a lesser eDtent this 
is also true for those I9Vcontracts that are not incenti)e compatiHleF ;oCe)erJ actual 
efficienc1 is loCer than the predicted efficienc1 for incenti)e compatiHle contractsF  
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9aHle T also shoCs hoC the use of incenti)e compatiHle contracts in the I9 alloCs the 
Hu1ers to )astl1 chanEe the distriHution of the Eains from tradeF In the 99 Hu1ers reap 
onl1 [RF^ percent K_FRu\\L of the total surplus Chile in the I9 the1 recei)e TT percent 
KRYF[u[_F^L of the smaller total surplus Chen the1 propose incenti)e compatiHle 
contractsF 9he taHle also indicates that incenti)e compatiHle contracts are much more 
profitaHle for the Hu1ers than nonVincenti)e compatiHle I9VcontractsF In )ieC of these 
larEe profit differencesJ it is surprisinE that ^S percent of all the contracts in the I9 are 
not incenti)e compatiHleF 9his fiEure hidesJ hoCe)erJ a stronEl1 increasinE time trend 
in the share of incenti)e compatiHle contractsF ahile in period R onl1 R_ percent of all 
I9Vcontracts Cere incenti)e compatiHleJ the share of incenti)e compatiHle contracts 
rises to T\ percent in the final tCo periodsF   
In our )ieC 6[ and 6\ are Muite remarkaHle Hecause the1 indicate that in the 
aHsence of incenti)es the outcome ma1 Cell He more efficient than predicted H1 the 
standard approach Chile the use of incenti)es ma1 triEEer factors that decrease 
efficienc1 relati)e to the standard predictionF 9aken toEether this ma1 render the 
complete aHsence of incenti)esJ like in our 99J more efficientF It isJ thereforeJ Muite 
important to ha)e a Hetter understandinE of the Heha)ioral forces Hehind 6[ and 6\F 
:rom 6R Ce alread1 knoC that Hu1ers in the I9 are consideraHl1 less Eenerous than 
Hu1ers in the 99F 9his suEEests the possiHilit1 that the dri)inE force Hehind 6[ and 6\ 
is Ei)en H1 Hu1ersi reluctance to make Eenerous offers in the I9F `erhapsJ the 
possiHilit1 of fininE sellers in the I9 has seduced Hu1ers to use onl1 the lstickm and to 
forEet aHout elicitinE Mualit1 H1 the lcarrotm of Eenerous offersF >ur neDt result shoCsJ 
hoCe)erJ that the undermininE of )oluntar1 cooperation in the I9 is not caused H1 less 
Eenerous Hu1ers in the I9 relati)e to the 99F 
  [Q
Result 4O 9he reduction of )oluntar1 cooperation in the I9 Cas not caused H1 loC 
price offersF 6atherJ loC price offers Cere the response to the reduction of the sellersi 
)oluntar1 cooperation in the I9F  
 
N first piece of e)idence in fa)or of 6Q is Ei)en in :iEure \ and 9aHles Q and ^F 9he 
fiEure and the taHles shoC thatJ for Ei)en prices le)elsJ the amount of )oluntar1 
cooperation is Eenerall1 loCer in the I9 compared Cith the 99F 9husJ e)en if the 
Hu1ers Could ha)e liked to induce hiEh le)els of )oluntar1 cooperation in the I9 H1 
offerinE Eenerous prices the1 Could not ha)e Heen aHle to achie)e their EoalF  
:iEures QJ ^N and ^I pro)ide further support for 6QF :iEure Q shoCs that in period 
R the a)eraEe price is e)en hiEher in the I9 than in the 99F netJ despite this feature 
)oluntar1 cooperation is consideraHl1 loCer in the I9 as indicated H1 :iEures ^N and 
^IF :iEure ^N shoCs that in period R of the I9 the sellers eDhiHited )oluntar1 
cooperation in onl1 ^ of the [Q cases Chile in RS cases their choices coincided Cith 
the Hest repl1 Mualit1F 9his differs sharpl1 from the Mualit1 choices in the 99F :iEure 
^I shoCs that in period R of the 99 onl1 T of the \Z Mualit1 choices Cere at the Hest 
repl1 le)el of qmin Chile in [Q of the \Z cases the sellers eDhiHited )oluntar1 
cooperationF  
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[\ !ue to identical oHser)ations not all oHser)ations Cith q r q* are )isiHle in :iEure ^NF >nl1 Q of the 
[Q contract offers Cere incenti)e compatiHleJ iFeFJ in [Z of the [Q cases qmin Cas the Hest repl1 Mualit1 in 
the I9F  
  [T
9he suHstantial reduction of  )oluntar1 cooperation in the I9 is also associated Cith a 
siEnificantl1 loCer aHsolute Mualit1 le)el relati)e to the 99 Kprob r FZ[ZJ Mann 
ahitne1 testJ tCoVtailedLF >n a)eraEeJ the first period Mualit1 in the 99 is ZF\T 
Chereas in the I9 it is onl1 ZF[\F 9husJ despite the fact that in period R prices in the I9 
Cere sliEhtl1 more Eenerous than in the 99 the sellers Cere less CillinE to cooperate 
)oluntaril1 and to pro)ide Mualit1 in the I9F 9his loC le)el of )oluntar1 cooperation in 
period R of the I9 caused losses for most of the Hu1ersF Ns a conseMuenceJ the Hu1ers 
suHstantiall1 cut Hack price offers in period [ of the I9 Ksee :iEure QLF :rom period [ 
onCards the price le)els are alCa1s much loCer in the I9 compared Cith the 99 Hut 
this reduction in prices in the I9 is plausiHl1 interpreted as a response to the 
HreakdoCn of )oluntar1 cooperation that occurred alread1 in period R of the I9F  
If the loC price offers of the Hu1ers Cere not the cause Hut the conseMuence of the 
loC le)els of )oluntar1 cooperation in the I9 j Chat Cas then the cause for the 
HreakdoCn of )oluntar1 cooperation3 In 8ection \F[ Ce discussed se)eral potential 
reasons that are related to ineMuit1 a)ersion and to notions of reciprocit1F >ne 
potentiall1 important reason is that in the 99 qp  is merel1 cheap talk Chile in the I9 qp  
can affect the sellersi Mualit1 choices neEati)el1F In the 99 it does not matter for an 
ineMuit1 a)erse seller Chether qp  is loC or hiEh j the seller can alCa1s choose the 
eEalitarian Mualit1 le)el qe Cithout ha)inE to face an1 neEati)e conseMuences in case 
that the Hu1er demanded more than qeF In the I9J hoCe)erJ an ineMuit1 a)erse seller 
Cho faces qp  w qe has the folloCinE proHlemF If he pro)ides qp  he incurs nonVpecuniar1 
costs from the unfair offerF If he Cants to correct the unfairness H1 pro)idinE less than 
qp  he faces the threat of HeinE punishedJ Chich Cill in Eeneral induce him to choose 
Mualit1 le)els e)en HeloC qe Hecause the pendinE punishment Cill chanEe the pa1off 
distriHution unfa)oraHl1 for the sellerF N necessar1 condition for the effecti)eness of 
this mechanism is that the sellers in the I9 did face a larEe numHer of contracts Cith qp  
w qeF It turns out that this Cas indeed the caseF In YQ percent of all contract offers in the 
I9 qp  w qe pre)ailedF InterestinEl1J in _T percent of the contract offers in the 99 qp  also 
eDceeded qeF 9he factJ that in the 99 )oluntar1 cooperation pre)ailed despite the 
eDistence of a larEe ma]orit1 of offers Cith qp  w qe lends support to the arEument that 
unfair offers are more likel1 to reduce )oluntar1 cooperation in the I9 Hecause the 
threat of HeinE fined causes further disad)antaEeous chanEes in the pa1off 
distriHutionF  
9he aHo)e arEument isJ hoCe)erJ not the onl1 possiHle reason for the HreakdoCn 
of )oluntar1 cooperation in the I9F ae alread1 mentioned in 8ection \F[ that fines 
desiEned to elicit hiEh Mualit1 le)els ma1 He percei)ed as hostile per seF In additionJ 
eDplicit incenti)es ma1 He percei)ed as a siEnal of distrust and to the eDtent to Chich 
  [_
distrust is percei)ed as unkindJ reciprocall1 moti)ated sellers respond to the fine Cith 
unkind Mualit1 le)elsF ae also con]ectured that the perception of the incenti)e de)ice 
as kind or unkind could He suH]ect to framinE effectsF If the same incenti)e is framed 
in a positi)e manner it ma1 perhaps He possiHle to pre)ent the reduction of )oluntar1 
cooperationF 9o test this con]ecture Ce ha)e conducted the soVcalled Ionus 9reatment 
KI9LF   
9he I9 is ]ust a reframinE of the I9F 9he onl1 difference HetCeen the I9 and the 
I9 is that in the I9 a shirkinE seller has to pa1 a fine f if cauEht shirkinE Chile in the 
I9 a shirkinE seller is not paid the Honus b if cauEht shirkinEF ahile in the I9 a 
contract consists of KpJ qp J fL the Hu1ers in the I9 stipulate contracts KpoJ qp J bL Chere 
po denotes the Hase price and b oHe1s Z " b " R\F Note that the Honus in the I9 oHe1s 
the same constraints as the fine in the I9F cikeCiseJ the proHaHilit1 that the Honus is 
not paid out in case of shirkinE is identical to the proHaHilit1 that the fine has to He 
paidF 9husJ Chile in the I9 the seller faces the threat of ha)inE to pa1 the fine f Cith 
proHaHilit1 sJ in the I9 the seller faces the isomorphic threat of not earninE the Honus 
b Cith proHaHilit1 sF[Q N seller in the I9 Cho faces a contract KpoJ qp J bL is eDactl1 in 
the same situation as a seller in the I9 Cho faces a contract KpJ qp J fL if p r po x b and f 
r bF Ns a conseMuence the standard modelJ models of ineMuit1 a)ersion and most 
reciprocit1 models predict that sellers Cho face identical contracts across conditions 
should Heha)e identicall1F 9his is so Hecause all these models rel1 on rational 
Heha)ior and predict a uniMue Mualit1 response to an1 Ei)en contractF 9husJ rational 
aEents in the I9 Cho face j in economic terms j the same contract as in the I9 should 
Heha)e identicall1 in the tCo situationsF netJ as our neDt result shoCs there are larEe 
Heha)ioral differences across I9 and I9F  
 
Result 5O Voluntary cooperation is much lower in the IT compared to the BT. Yet, in 
the BT voluntary cooperation is lower than in the TT.  
 
ae pro)ide support for 6^ in :iEure T and in 9aHle _F :iEure T shoCs )oluntar1 
cooperation as a function of the offered total compensationF In the 99 and the I9 the 
offered total compensation in case of q r qp  Cas eMual to the priceF In the I9 the 
offered total compensation for q r qp  Cas eMual to po x bF :iEure T indicates that 
)oluntar1 cooperation is hiEhest in the 99J someChat loCer in the I9 and loCest in 
                                                 
[Q 6ecall that in the eDperimental instructions for the I9 Ce did not use the term fineF ae used instead 
the terms lpotential price deductionm from the aEreed upon priceF In the instructions for the I9 Ce used 
the term lpotential supplementar1 pricem that Cas paid in addition to the aEreed upon priceF  
  [Y
the I9F Moreo)erJ the fiEure also suEEests that Chile )oluntar1 cooperation does not 
respond to total compensation in the I9J it responds positi)el1 in the 99 and the I9F  
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9he impression con)e1ed H1 :iEure T is confirmed H1 a comparison of reEression 
results in 9aHles Q and ^ Cith those in 9aHle _F In 9aHle _ Ce present the reEressions 
for the I9F In contrast to the reEressions for the I9 Ksee 9aHle ^L the coefficient for 
pit(NIC is siEnificantl1 positi)e indicatinE that the compensation offered in case of 
nonVincenti)e compatiHle contracts has a positi)e impact on )oluntar1 cooperation in 
the I9F 9his effect pre)ails in all three time periods considered as Cell as for the 
o)erall reEression in 9aHle _F ;oCe)erJ a comparison of the coefficient for the 
compensation for nonVincenti)e compatiHle contractsJ pit(NICJ in 9aHle _ Cith the 
slope for pit in the 99 Ksee 9aHle QL indicates that the slope in the I9 is Eenerall1 
flatterF 9he null h1pothesis of eMual slopes can He re]ected at the p r FZ[Q le)el of 
siEnificance indicatinE that increases in monetar1 compensation led to larEer increases 
in )oluntar1 cooperation in the 99F 
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9NIc5 _ 
Response of voluntary cooperation (q – q* > 0) and under-performance (q – q* < 0) 
to the monetary compensation (po+b) in the Bonus Treatment 
 !ependent )ariaHleO q – q* 
 all periods periods RVQ periods ^VY periods SVR[ 
 coefF 
KroHF sFeFL 
fV
)alue 
coefF 
KroHF 
sFeFL 
fV
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)alue 
constant ZFZ[^ 
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pit(NIC  ZFZZY444 
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Note: 9he estimation procedure is censored reEression Cith roHust standard errorsF IC denotes a dumm1 for the nonV
incenti)e compatiHle contracts and pit measures the total compensation KpoxbL in case of q r qp F pit!IC is an interaction 
)ariaHle of the IC dumm1 Cith pitF pit!NIC is an interaction )ariaHle of pit Cith a dumm1 NICJ Chich denotes nonVincenti)e 
compatiHle contractsF itqp !IC K itqp !NICL measures the interaction HetCeen qp  and the dumm1 IC KNICLF 6e]ected contract 
offers are eDcludedF 6oHust standard errors are in parenthesesF 444J 44J 4 denote siEnificance at the RVJ ^V and RZVpercent 
le)elJ respecti)el1F 
 
9he consideraHl1 hiEher le)els of )oluntar1 cooperation in the I9 relati)e to the I9 
indicate that the framinE of incenti)es mattersF 9here areJ in our )ieCJ tCo potential 
eDplanations for the framinE effectF >ne eDplanation relies on a comHination of the 
notion of reciprocit1 Cith a specific aspect of Hounded rationalit1F[^ 9he other 
eDplanation relies on the eDistence of multiple eMuiliHria in the !ufCenHerEV
eirchsteiEer model of reciprocit1F 6ecall that the definition of reciprocit1 depends on 
the notion of kind and hostile actionsF ahat is percei)ed as kind or hostile dependsJ in 
turnJ ine)itaHl1 on a neutral reference pointF 9he presence of a framinE effect is 
consistent Cith the )ieC that the reference pointJ Chich pro)ides the Hasis for 
                                                 
[^ 8elten KRSSYL also arEues that there are interactions HetCeen Hounded rationalit1 and reciprocit1F  
  \Z
cateEorifinE an action as kind or hostileJ can He manipulated H1 the framinE of the 
incenti)eF In the neEati)e frame the total compensation in case of nonVshirkinE seems 
to pro)ide a natural reference point and the fine focuses attention on the fact that 
somethinE Cill He taken aCa1 in case of )erified shirkinEF In the positi)e frame the 
Hase compensation is the natural reference point and the Honus focuses attention on 
the fact that somethinE Cill He Ei)en if the desired Mualit1 is pro)idedF It ma1 Cell He 
that ltakinE aCa1 somethinEm is percei)ed as less friendl1 than lnot Ei)inE 
somethinEm e)en if the total compensation is identicalF 
N prominent feature of the !ufCenHerEVeirchsteiEer model is that in seMuential 
Eames like ours the model t1picall1 eDhiHits a host of eMuiliHriaF[T 8ome of these 
eMuiliHria are characterifed H1 mutual kindness Chereas others are characterifed H1 
mutual hostilit1F In principleJ it is therefore possiHle that the framinE of the incenti)e 
affects the pla1ersi Heliefs and as a conseMuence the sellers choose different Mualit1 
le)els in the different framesF IfJ for eDampleJ the fine chanEes the pla1ers Heliefs such 
that the1 coordinate on an eMuiliHrium Cith mutual hostilit1 Chereas the Honus 
induces Heliefs such that the1 coordinate on an eMuiliHrium Cith mutual kindness a 
framinE effect arisesF  
9he aHo)e interpretations areJ of courseJ eDVpost rationalifations of the e)idence 
that reMuire further thouEht and eDperimentsF 9o eDamine the )alidit1 of the second 
interpretation it CouldJ in particularJ He necessar1 to measure the pla1ersi HeliefsF 
;a)inE said thisJ it is also CorthChile to point out that an important part of the 
decrease in )oluntar1 cooperation is consistent Cith models of ineMuit1 a)ersion 
Hecause in the I9 )oluntar1 cooperation is siEnificantl1 loCer than in the 99F 9his 
means that the framinE effect eDplains onl1 part of the difference in )oluntar1 
cooperation across the 99 and the I9F  
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9his paper shoCs that )oluntar1 cooperation ma1 indeed He undermined H1 incenti)e 
contractsF If the Hu1ers can fine the sellers for malfeasance the1 almost uni)ersall1 
propose contracts Cith fines and pa1J on a)eraEeJ consideraHl1 loCer prices compared 
to a situation Chere no fines are a)ailaHleF 9he use of fines causesJ hoCe)erJ a 
suHstantial reduction in )oluntar1 cooperation and efficienc1F 5)en if the Hu1ers 
comHine the threat of fininE Cith the pa1ment of relati)el1 hiEh prices the sellersi 
                                                 
[T :or instanceJ in the ultimatum Eame and in the seMuential prisoneris dilemma there are a larEe numHer 
of eMuiliHriaF  
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)oluntar1 cooperation remains loCF 9he pa1ment of Eenerous prices makes thus no 
sense in the Incenti)e 9reatment Chereas in the 9rust 9reatment the Hu1ers can induce 
increases in )oluntar1 cooperation H1 increasinE their price offersF  
9he undermininE of )oluntar1 cooperation throuEh eDplicit fines is incompatiHle 
Cith the standard principalVaEent model that assumes selfVinterested aEentsF It isJ in 
principleJ consistent Cith rational choice models of ineMuit1 a)ersionF If sellers are 
ineMuit1 a)erse and the Hu1ers demand Mualit1 le)els aHo)e the eEalitarian Mualit1 qe 
the sellers incur nonVpecuniar1 ineMuit1 costs if the1 pro)ide the demanded Mualit1 
le)elF ;oCe)erJ if the1 Cant to a)oid the ineMuit1 costs H1 pro)idinE less than the 
demanded Mualit1 the1 are fined Cith positi)e proHaHilit1F 9his causes a further 
disad)antaEeous chanEe in the pa1off distriHutionF Ns a conseMuenceJ ineMuit1 a)erse 
sellers CillJ in EeneralJ pro)ide Mualit1 HeloC qe Chen the1 face a threat of HeinE fined 
Chile in the aHsence of this threat the1 are CillinE to pro)ide qeF  
:urther eDperiments shoCJ hoCe)erJ that an interpretation of the oHser)ed 
counterproducti)e incenti)e effect in terms of ineMuit1 a)ersion cannot tell the Chole 
stor1F If the a)ailaHle incenti)e is framed as a Honus that is paid in addition to a Hase 
compensation )oluntar1 cooperation isJ ceteris pariHusJ siEnificantl1 hiEher than in a 
situation in Chich the incenti)e is framed as a price deductionF In the Honus frame 
)oluntar1 cooperation aEain responds positi)el1 to the price le)elF 9his framinE effect 
is compatiHle Cith the )ieC that perceptions of kindness and hostilit1J Chich are 
crucial for reciprocal Mualit1 responsesJ can He manipulated H1 the framinE of 
incenti)esF 9he framinE effect ma1J thereforeJ He due to a shift in the reference point 
that pro)ides the Hasis for ]udEinE actions as hostile or kindF 9he framinE effect isJ 
hoCe)erJ also consistent Cith the !ufCenHerEVeirchsteiEer model of reciprocit1F 9his 
model t1picall1 eDhiHits multiple eMuiliHria and to the eDtent to Chich different frames 
coordinate pla1ers on different eMuiliHria a framinE effect occursF  
>ur eDperiment and our conclusions differ in se)eral important Ca1s from the 
social ps1choloE1 literature that aims at testinE the undermininE of intrinsic 
moti)ation throuEh monetar1 reCards KCameron and `ierce RSSQJ !eciJ eoestner and 
61an RSSSLF[_ :irstJ and perhaps most importantl1J in the ps1choloEical eDperiments 
no principals are presentJ iFeFJ the eDperimental suH]ects are alCa1s confronted Cith an 
incenti)e that is eDoEenousl1 set H1 the eDperimenterF ;oCe)erJ as our discussion in 
8ection \F[ suEEestsJ in our conteDt )ariations in )oluntar1 cooperation are the result 
of )ariations in the percei)ed fairness of the pa1off distriHution HetCeen a principal 
and an aEent and )ariations in the percei)ed fairness of the principalis actionF 9husJ 
                                                 
[_ :or a critical e)aluation of this literature from the Heha)ioral economics )ieCpoint see :ehr and :alk 
K[ZZ[LF  
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the ps1choloEical forces stemminE from the relation HetCeen principal and aEent are 
aHsent in the eDperiments on intrinsic moti)ationF InsteadJ the suH]ects in these 
eDperiments are enEaEed in an acti)it1 that is assumed to He intrinsicall1 pleasuraHleF  
8econdJ on the Hasis of the ps1choloEical eDperiments it is not possiHle to ]udEe 
the economic importance of the undermininE of intrinsic moti)ation Hecause the )alue 
of the output of the acti)it1 is not determinedF 9his is rele)ant insofar as the incenti)e 
ma1 affect intrinsic moti)ation neEati)el1 Hut this neEati)e effect ma1 He 
o)ercompensated H1 the positi)e effect of eDtrinsic moti)ation on Mualit1 so that 
o)erall efficienc1 is nonetheless enhanced H1 the incenti)eF  
9hirdJ the proponents of an undermininE effect claim that e)en flat pa1ments 
reduce intrinsic moti)ation K!eciJ eoestner and 61an RSSSLF 9his is hiEhl1 
implausiHle in our conteDt Chere fairness concerns pla1 a prominent roleF In factJ in 
our eDperiments increases in the price are ne)er associated Cith decreases in a)eraEe 
cooperation or a)eraEe Mualit1F Instead price increases in the 99 and the I9 are 
associated Cith increases in )oluntar1 cooperationF 5)en for the incenti)e compatiHle 
contracts in the I9 Ce oHser)e a positi)e effect of price increases Hecause hiEher 
prices decrease the underVperformance of sellersF 9his demonstrates that the forces 
contriHutinE to )oluntar1 cooperation in our eDperiments are Muite distinct from the 
forces assumed to He operati)e in the ps1choloEical eDperimentsF Ns a conseMuenceJ 
the mechanisms responsiHle for counterVproducti)e incenti)e effects are likel1 to He 
Muite differentJ tooF  
ahat are the implications of our results for contract and incenti)e theor13 
NlthouEh in our )ieC the results certainl1 do not mean that performance incenti)es 
CillJ in EeneralJ impair efficienc1 Ce Helie)e that the undermininE of )oluntar1 
cooperation is a possiHilit1 that should He taken seriousl1F 9here are noC se)eral other 
papers shoCinE similar effectsF In ?neef1 and 6ustichini K[ZZZaL it is shoCn that the 
introduction of price incenti)es for parents Cho are late pickinE up their children from 
the kinderEarten increases the freMuenc1 of lateVcominE parentsF ?neef1 and 
6ustichini K[ZZZHL shoC that monetar1 reCards for pupils Cho collect mone1 from 
households for social purposes ma1 decrease the amount of mone1 collectedF :ehr and 
:alk K[ZZ[L shoC that the results H1 ?neef1 and 6ustichini can He neatl1 interpreted 
in terms of interactions HetCeen social appro)al and eDplicit performance incenti)esF 
IohnetJ :re1 and ;uck K[ZZRL conducted a contract enforcement eDperiment in Chich 
the proHaHilit1 of fininE sellers for the Hreach of a contract is )ariedF It turns out that 
the propensit1 to oHe1 the contract is nonVmonotonic in this proHaHilit1F Nt loC and 
hiEh proHaHilities contracts are less likel1 to He Hroken relati)e to a situation Cith an 
intermediate proHaHilit1 of HeinE finedF :ehr and 6ockenHach K[ZZZL conducted a 
  \\
9rust eDperiment Cith and Cithout punishment opportunities for the principalF 9heir 
results indicate that if the principal j althouEh he has the opportunit1 to punish the 
aEent for malfeasance j )oluntaril1 refrains from threateninE to punish the aEentJ 
)oluntar1 cooperation H1 the aEents is enhancedF 
NlthouEh these results do not 1et Ei)e us clear and sharp ansCers Ch1 and under 
Chich conditions )oluntar1 cooperation Cill He undermined the1 suEEest that eDplicit 
incenti)es ma1 indeed ha)e counterproducti)e incenti)e effects that cannot He 
accounted for H1 traditional principalVaEent models that assume completel1 selfish 
preferencesF ;oCe)erJ reEardless of the impact of framinEJ there seem to He incenti)e 
contracts that lea)e )oluntar1 cooperation intactF :or instanceJ NnderhuHJ ?ychter and 
ekniEstein K[ZZZL oHser)e a lot of )oluntar1 cooperation Chen aEents face fair 
re)enueVsharinE contractsF 9here is also e)idence that implicit performance incenti)es 
Eenerated H1 repeated interactions ha)e poCerful positive effects on Mualit1 Ksee 
?ychter and :alk [ZZ[LF 9husJ an important Muestion for future research is to identif1 
the conditions under Chich performance incenti)es HackfireF 9his reMuiresJ amonE 
other thinEsJ a much Hetter understandinE of the interaction HetCeen ps1choloEical 
and economic forces in principalVaEent relationsF   
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These instructions were originally written in German. Here we present the 
instructions of our Incentive-Treatment. The instructions of the Trust-Treatment were 
identical, except for those differences in design that are peculiar to the Incentive-
Treatment.   
 
Introductory Remarks Kidentical for buyers and sellersL 
9he eDperimentJ in Chich 1ou participate toda1J is part of a research pro]ect that is funded H1 
)arious research fundsF Its purpose is to stud1 decision makinE in marketsF nour income in 
this eDperiment consists of :rF R^FV for 1our shoCVup and all pa1ment that 1ou Cill earn 
durinE the eDperiment accordinE to 1our decisions and those of other participantsF !urinE the 
eDperiment 1our income Cill He calculated in points Chere 1 point = 8 Rappen. Calculated 
in points the shoCVup fee of :rF R^ amounts to RY_F^ pointsF In addition 1ou Cill recei)e an 
endoCment of RR[F^ pointsJ Chich implies that in total 1ou Cill ha)e 300 points at 1our 
disposal to co)er losses that ma1 occur durinE the eDperimentF However, with your own 
decisions you can always prevent losses with certainty. At the end of the experiment all 
points, which you earned during the experiment will be summed up, exchanged into 
Swiss Francs, and paid out to you in cash immediately. 
:irst Ce Could like to ask 1ou to read these instructions carefull1J and then to ansCer the 
control MuestionsF Nfter all participants ha)e correctl1 ansCered all MuestionsJ Ce Cill start 
Cith the eDperimentJ in Chich 1ou Cill need the R[ decision sheets and the leaflet Chich ha)e 
Heen handed out to 1ou toEether Cith these instructionsF Please notice that all written 
information that you receive from us, is for your private use only. You are not allowed 
to transmit any information to other participants of this experiment. It is also 
prohibited to communicate with the other participants. Otherwise we would have to 
break off the experiment. If you have questions, please ask us.   
 
General Information (identical for buyers and sellers)  
} In this eDperiment there are Hu1ers and sellersF 9he eDperiment comprises R[ tradinE 
periodsF 
} 5ach tradinE da1 consists of tCo staEesF Nt the first stage each Hu1er decides on an offerJ 
Chich contains the conditions under Chich the Hu1er is prepared to Hu1 a commodit1 from 
a sellerF 8uch an offer consists of a priceJ a desired Mualit1 and a potential price deductionF 
9here are ten possiHle Mualit1 le)elsF   
} Nt the second stage a random mechanism determines an order accordinE to Chich the 
sellers can choose amonE the a)ailaHle offersF No seller is oHliEed to accept a HidJ and no 
Hu1er is forced to make an offerF Nll sellers Cho ha)e accepted an offerJ ha)e to decide 
Chich Mualit1 the1 Cill actuall1 deli)erF ChoosinE a Mualit1 le)el entails costs for the 
sellerF Nfter the seller has determined the lactual Mualit1m the respecti)e Hu1er Cill He 
informed aHout itF  
} In principle the seller can choose a Mualit1 le)el that is hiEherJ eMualJ or loCer than the 
desired Mualit1F If the actual Mualit1 is loCer than the desired Mualit1J then the potential 
price deduction specified in the contract is due Cith a proHaHilit1 of \\F\ percentF ;enceJ 
Cith a loCer than the desired Mualit1J the specified price deduction is on average due in 
one out of three casesF 9he seller Cill onl1 learn after his actual Mualit1 choice Chether the 
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price deduction is due or notF N tradinE da1 is o)er after all sellers Cho ha)e accepted an 
offerJ ha)e determined their actual Mualit1 and all HarEaininE partners ha)e Heen informed 
Chether there is a price deductionF 
} 9here are more sellers than Hu1ersF Nll sellers and Hu1ers knoC thisF 5ach seller Kor Hu1erJ 
respFL can onl1 sell KHu1L one unit per tradinE da1F In the folloCinE 1ou Cill find an eDact 
description of the staEesJ iFeFJ Chich decisions are possiHleJ and an eDact description of 
hoC pa1offs are calculatedF 
Detailed Information for Buyers 
In the market a certain commodit1 is traded and each seller sells the same commodit1F 5ach 
seller can sell to each Hu1er and each Hu1er can Hu1 from each sellerF 9he market is 
orEanifed as folloCsF ae open the market for a tradinE da1 and 1ou Cill recei)e from us 100 
points for each commodit1 that 1ou Hu1F 9his amount is the same for all Hu1ersF 5ach Hu1er 
and each seller knoCs that 1ou Cill recei)e RZZ points per unit of the commodit1F nou noC 
ha)e the possiHilit1 to make an offerF An offer consists of a price, a desired quality and a 
potential price deduction. :or makinE an offer the folloCinE rules holdO  
1. `er tradinE da1 1ou are onl1 alloCed to make one offerF nou are not oHliEed to make an 
offerF 
2. ConcerninE the "desired quality" the folloCinE holdsO 9here are ten possible quality 
levels, from Chich 1ou can choose 1our desired Mualit1F 9he loCest Mualit1 is ZFR and the 
hiEhest one is RF IeloCJ the impact of the selleris deli)ered Mualit1 on 1our pa1off Cill 
He descriHed in more detailF It holds true that 1our pa1off in points is the hiEher the 
hiEher the deli)ered Mualit1 isF N Mualit1 choice entails quality costs for the sellerF On 
the leaflet you will find the table with all feasible quality levels and the associated 
quality costs! All sellers have the same cost schedule.  
3. 9he price can at most be 100 and has at least to cover the seller’s quality cost. :or 
eDampleJ if 1ou ask for the Mualit1 le)el ZF\J 1ou ha)e to offer at least a price of [J for a 
Mualit1 of ZF\ entails costs of [ units for the sellerF `rices ha)e to He in integers. In 
summar1J for the determination of the price the folloCinE rule holdsO  
100 ! price ! quality costs. 
4. 9he potential price deduction has not to He loCer than Z and larEer than R\O  
13 ! potential price deduction ! 0. 
 The potential price deduction has to be stated in integers.  
If 1ou ha)e decided on a priceJ a potential price deduction and a desired Mualit1J please insert 
them in the HoD "proposed offer" on 1our decision sheet.  
After 1ou ha)e made 1our offerJ 1ou ha)e to roll a siDVsided dieF 6ollinE the die determines 
Chether the price deduction is due in case of an underVpro)ision of the desired Mualit1F 9he 
folloCinE rule holdO If the numHers 1 or 2 shoC up KCith a proHaHilit1 of Ru\L the price 
deduction is eDacted in case of an underVpro)isionq if the numHers 3, 4, 5, or 6 shoC upJ the 
price deduction Cill not He implementedF `lease insert the result in the HoD “Price deduction 
due in case of under-provision?” on 1our decision sheet.  
nour offer Cill He Critten on the HlackHoard and transmitted to the sellersF In the sellersi 
room all offers on a tradinE da1 Cill He Critten on the HlackHoard in a random order. 
Moreo)erJ on each tradinE da1 a random mechanism determines the order accordinE to Chich 
sellers are alloCed to choose amonE the offersF The sellers will not learn which buyer has 
made which offer and you as a buyer will not learn which seller has accepted which 
offer. 5ach seller can onl1 accept one offer per tradinE da1F 9he sellers cannot make 
counteroffersF  
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After a seller has accepted an offerJ he determines the lactual Mualit1m of the commodit1J iFeFJ 
he chooses a Mualit1 le)el from the Mualit1 le)els mentioned on the leafletF ;enceJ the sellers 
can choose amonE eDactl1 the same Mualit1 le)els as 1ou canF Ns alread1 mentionedJ for the 
seller choosinE a Mualit1 entails Mualit1 costsF  
ahen a seller determines the lactual Mualit1m of the sold commodit1J he does not knoC 
Chether in case the actual Mualit1 falls short of the desired Mualit1 the price deduction Cill He 
implemented or notF ;enceJ the seller does not knoC the numHers that shoCed up in 1our 
throCinE of the dieF 9he seller onl1 knoCs that an underVpro)ision leads to a price deduction 
Cith a proHaHilit1 of Ru\F  
5ach seller personall1 and completel1 anon1mousl1 decides on the actual Mualit1 of Chich 
onl1 1ou Cill He informed KiFeFJ it Cill He inserted in the roC lactual Mualit1m on 1our decision 
sheetLF nou Cill not learn the identit1 of the sellerF ;enceJ no other Hu1er and no other seller 
Cill learn aHout the actual Mualit1 choice of l1ourm sellerF  
If the seller has made an actual Mualit1 choice that falls short of 1our desired Mualit1 and if 
the price deduction is due KiFeFJ if the die numHers are R or [L then 1ou onl1 ha)e to pa1 the 
seller the offered price minus the price deductionF If the price deduction is not dueJ 1ou ha)e 
to pa1 the offered priceF 
nou noC ha)e all necessar1 information to calculate 1our oCn pa1off as Cell as the pa1off of 
l1ourm sellerF 9his ends a tradinE da1 and the neDt one startsF In total there Cill He R[ tradinE 
da1s durinE Chich 1ou can earn mone1F  
 
The Calculation of Buyer’s Payoffs at the End of a Trading Day Kfor sellers this 
sheet was adapted accordingly but was otherwise identicalL 
Nt the end of a tradinE da1 there are the folloCinE possiHilitiesO 
1. If 1ou ha)e not made an offerJ or if 1our offer has not Heen accepted H1 a sellerJ 1ou 
ha)e not HouEht a unit and 1our payoff is 0 points.  
2. nour offer has Heen accepted and the selleris actual Mualit1 conforms to or is hiEher 
than 1our desired Mualit1F In this case 1our pa1off and the pa1off of 1our seller is Kin 
pointsLO 
Your payoff  =  RZZ!actual quality j price  
Seller’s payoff  =  `rice j Mualit1 costs 
3. nour offer has Heen acceptedJ Hut the seller has chosen a loCer than 1our desired 
Mualit1F  
(a) 9he price deduction cannot He eDactedJ Hecause the die numHers \J QJ ^ or T 
shoCed upF In this case 1our pa1off and the pa1off of 1our seller isO 
Your payoff  =  RZZ!actual quality j price  
Seller’s payoff  =  `rice j Mualit1 costs 
(b) 9he die numHers R and [ shoCed upJ iFeFJ the price deduction can He implementedF 
In this case 1our pa1off and the pa1off of 1our seller isO 
Your payoff  =  RZZ!actual quality j price x price deduction 
Seller’s payoff  =  `rice j Mualit1 costs – price deduction 
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Each seller and each buyer is informed about the details of this payoff calculation. 
Hence, “your“ seller can calculate your payoff in points and you can calculate the 
payoff of “your” seller. !o 1ou ha)e an1 Muestions3 
 
Buyers’ Control Questionnaire Kfor sellers the control questionnaire was adapted 
accordingly but was otherwise identicalL 
1. nou ha)e not made an offerF ahat is 1our pa1off3 
2. Knot asked with sellersLnou Could like to demand an effort le)el of ZF_F  
 (a) ahat is the hiEhest feasiHle price3 
 (b) ahat is the loCest price that 1ou ha)e to offer3 
 (c) ahat is the maDimal potential pa1off deduction3 
3.  nou ha)e made the folloCinE offerO 
 Price = 40  
 Desired quality = 0.8 
 Potential price deduction = 10 
 (a) 9he actual Mualit1 of l1ourm seller is ZFY and die numHers R and [ shoCed upF 
 ahat is 1our pa1off3    ahat is the pa1off of l1ourm seller3 
 (b) 9he actual Mualit1 of 1our seller is ZF[ and die numHers R and [ shoCed upF 
 ahat is 1our pa1off3    ahat is the pa1off of l1ourm seller3 
 (c) 9he actual Mualit1 of 1our seller is ZF[ and die numHer ^ shoCed upF 
 ahat is 1our pa1off3    ahat is the pa1off of l1ourm seller3 
4.  nou ha)e made the folloCinE offerO 
 Price = 15 
 Desired quality = 0.9 
 Potential price deduction = 13 
 (a) 9he actual Mualit1 of l1ourm seller is ZFSF 
 ahat is 1our pa1off3    ahat is the pa1off of l1ourm seller3 
 (b) 9he actual Mualit1 of 1our seller is ZFR and die numHers R and [ shoCed upF 
 ahat is 1our pa1off3    ahat is the pa1off of l1ourm seller3 
 (c) 9he actual Mualit1 of 1our seller is ZFR and die numHer \ shoCed upF 
 ahat is 1our pa1off3    ahat is the pa1off of l1ourm seller3 
 
 
 
Leaflet Kidentical for buyers and sellersL 
`oints for Hu1er per unit HouEhtO RZZ 
:or makinE an offer the folloCinE rules holdO 
RZZ " price " Mualit1 costs 
R\ " potential price deduction " Z 
Quality and cost of quality for the seller: 
quality 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
cost of 
Mualit1  
Z R [ Q T Y RZ R[ R^ RY 
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Buyers’ decision sheet KR per periodq R[ sheets in totalL 
KThe decision sheet of sellers was adapted accordingly but was otherwise identicalL 
 
Proposed offer 
`rice  KpL 
!esired Mualit1 
`otential price deduction KsL 
 
Price deduction due in case of under-provision? K`lease mark the appropriate HoDL 
!ie numHers RJ [  !ie numHers \J QJ ^J T 
O Yes O No 
 
Seller’s actual quality (q)  
 
Payoff of the concluded deal 
No offer made 
`a1off r 
If the desired quality has been delivered or exceeded 
nour pa1off  
RZZ~M V p r 
`a1off seller 
p V costs of Mualit1 r  
 If the actual quality fell short of the desired quality 
Price deduction is due Price deduction is not due 
nour pa1off  
RZZ~M V p x s r 
`a1off 8eller 
p V cKML V s r 
nour pa1off  
RZZ~M V p r 
`a1off 8eller 
p V cKML r 
 
Detailed Information for Sellers 
In the market a certain commodit1 is traded and each seller sells the same commodit1F 5ach 
seller can sell to each Hu1er and each Hu1er can Hu1 from each sellerF  
5ach Hu1er recei)es from us on each tradinE da1 RZZ pointsJ Chich he can use for Hu1inE a 
commodit1F Nll Hu1ers and sellers knoC thisF  
9he orEanifation of the market is as folloCsO ae open the market for one tradinE da1F :irstJ 
Cithout communicatinE Cith other Hu1ersJ each Hu1er can make an offerF An offer consists 
of a price, a desired quality and a potential price deductionF 9here are ten possiHle Mualit1 
le)els from Chich the Hu1erJ and 1ou as a sellerJ respecti)el1J can chooseF 9he loCest Mualit1 
is ZFR and the hiEhest Mualit1 is RF 9he impact of the Mualit1 of the deli)ered Eood on the 
pa1offs Cill HeloC He descriHed in more detailF In EeneralJ hoCe)erJ it holds true that a hiEh 
Mualit1 increases 1our cost and the pa1off of the Hu1erF >n the leaflet 1ou Cill find a taHle 
Cith all possiHle Mualit1 le)els and the associated Mualit1 costs of 1our Mualit1 choiceF  
9he neDt step after all Hu1ers had the opportunit1 to make an offerJ is the transmission of the 
offers to this room Chere the offers Cill He Critten on the HlackHoard in a random orderF nou 
Cill not learn Chich Hu1er made Chich offerF NoC a random de)ice determines the order 
accordinE to Chich 1ou as a seller can choose amonE the offersF ae implement this as 
folloCsF nou ha)e to draC one out of Y cards that are numHered from R to YF 9he seller Cho 
picks card noF R is the first Cho has the opportunit1 to pick an offerq the seller Cho draCs 
card noF [ is the second to pick an offerJ and so onF nou Cill make 1our choice as folloCsO 
ahen it is 1our turn to make a choiceJ 1ou state 1our seller number and 1our chosen offerF 
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>n a tradinE da1 1ou can accept onl1 one offerF nou are not oHliEed to accept an offerF The 
buyers will not be informed which offer you have accepted; the buyer will only know, 
whether their offer has been accepted or not. nour chosen offer Cill He deleted from the 
HlackHoard and it is the turn of the neDt seller to make a choice amonE the remaininE offersF  
If 1ou ha)e accepted an offerJ Ce ask 1ou to insert on 1our decision sheet the priceJ the 
desired Mualit1 and the potential price deduction into the HoD lAccepted Offer”. NoC 1ou 
ha)e to decide Chich Mualit1 le)el 1ou Cill deli)erF Ns alread1 mentionedJ the choice of a 
Mualit1 le)el is associated Cith Mualit1 costs that 1ou ha)e to HearF On the leaflet you will 
find the table with the feasible quality levels and the associated costs for you! Both the 
buyers and the sellers know this table. `lease insert 1our actual Mualit1 le)el on 1our 
decision sheet in the roC “Actual Quality”. No other seller Cill He informed aHout 1our 
Mualit1 choiceF We therefore ask you not to talk about your “actual quality”. 5ach Hu1er 
is onl1 informed aHout the lactual Mualit1m of lhism sellerF Moreo)erJ the Hu1er Cill not learn 
the identit1 of lhism sellerF ;enceJ the anon1mit1 of 1our Mualit1 choice is completel1 
securedF   
ahether the potential price deduction is due or notJ depends on 1our Mualit1 choice and on 
chanceF If 1ou ha)e deli)ered or eDceeded the desired Mualit1 1ou Cill recei)e the accepted 
price in an1 case and the price deduction is not eDactedF IfJ hoCe)erJ 1our actual Mualit1 fell 
short of the desired Mualit1J the price deduction ma1 He implementedF ahether the price 
deduction is dueJ depends on the result of the folloCinE procedureO l1ourm Hu1er rolls a siDV
sided dieF If the numHers R and [ turn upJ the price deduction Cill He implementedF If the 
numHers \J QJ ^J or T shoC upJ the price deduction Cill not He implementedF ae Cill indicate 
Chether the price deduction j in case of an underVpro)ision of Mualit1 j is due or notJ H1 
checkinE the respecti)e HoD on 1our decision sheetF nou Cill recei)e this information after 
1ou ha)e determined 1our actual Mualit1 le)elF  
nou noC ha)e all necessar1 information to calculate 1our oCn pa1off as Cell as the pa1off of 
l1ourm sellerF 9his ends a tradinE da1 and the neDt one startsF In total there Cill He R[ tradinE 
da1s durinE Chich 1ou can earn mone1F  
 
 
